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Resource management in the coastal zone involves a large number of stakeholders 
and resource users, from traditional fishermen and recreational housing owners to 
state and municipal government. The aim of this study is to show how spatial scarcity 
in Norwegian aquaculture is not solely a technical definition, but scarcity also 
depends upon the social context in which it operates. That is, what has influenced 
Norwegian aquaculture policy in spatial terms? This question is answered by looking 
at how allocation of space has developed from the early 1970s and to the present, 
what actors were involved, what arguments did they use and what was the spatial 
outcome of the chosen policies. Through a literature review, I have shown how 
discourses of regional policy, industrial policy, environmental policy and health 
policy have affected the spatial allocation of aquaculture licenses in the past. 
Moreover, I show that these discourses are a part of a larger coastal zone 
management discourse, which is becoming increasingly popular. Thus, scarcity of 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
The Norwegian coastline is long. If we include the coastline along inlets and 
islands it turns out to be over 57 000 km (Sandersen, 1996:2). This area includes a 
large number of invaluable natural resources, such as fish, shellfish and seaweed.  
The Norwegian coastal waters are not only large in area, they are also sheltered, have 
good circulation of water, and the Gulf Stream ensures a yearly middle temperature of 
8.4°C. These are characteristics that are favourable for aquaculture (Thomassen, 
1985). 
The Norwegian aquaculture industry has experienced an immense growth 
since its introduction in the 1950s and has become a large industry of great value 
(Berge, 2001). Norway has become the largest producer and exporter of farmed 
Atlantic salmon and produced 446 000 tons in 2002 (NHL, 2003).  
 
World production of Atlantic salmon. Tons 
Country 2000 2001 
Norway 419 000 415 000 
Great Britain 124 000 149 000 
Chile 150 000 219 000 
Canada 77 000 86 000 
Others 86 000 106 000 
 856 000 975 000 
Table 1: World Production of Atlantic Salmon in tons (Fid, 2002 (Exportutvalget for fisk)). 
 
Production and sales of farmed fish create both employment and revenue on 
national and regional levels. In 2002, the Norwegian aquaculture industry exported a 
total of about 500 000 tons salmon and trout (round weight) at a value of 9 billion 
NOK. A total number of about 3 700 persons were employed in the farming of salmon 
and trout in 2001 (SSB1, 2003).  
To produce healthy and clean food an environment devoid of pollution and 
disease is required. Localities with suitable conditions minimize the risk of pollution, 
and disease. Thus, a location with good water exchange and recipient is required, such 
conditions are usually found in rural fjords. Consequently, due to the strict 
requirements to the physical environment, aquaculture is a regional industry. 
Moreover, these regions have the advantage of having settlements all along the coast 
and a relatively well-developed infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, airports, service 
industry, health services, and so forth. In addition, the people along the coast are, 
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because of ties to traditional coastal fisheries, well adept to working with fish. 
Consequently, aquaculture farms have usually been placed in such rural areas.  
That these areas are sparsely populated does not imply that coastal areas have 
not been utilized. The Norwegian population has traditionally used natural resources 
for survival and recreation. As a result, a number of interests in the coastal zone exist. 
The fast expansion of aquaculture has, however, imposed limits to the traditional uses 
and created conflicts with respect to user rights.  
Large funds have been invested in aquaculture research and Norway has 
become one of the leading nations within this field. The majority of research has been 
carried out on salmonid species, hence the great success in the salmon industry. 
Nevertheless, other countries have also invested in research and improved their 
methods. As a result, the world production has increased to a point where the price of 
farmed salmon has, in periods, stagnated. This led to more research, with special 
attention to new species (Thomassen, 1985). At the moment one of the species in 
focus is cod.   
The future of cod farming might seem bright, but there are many barriers 
before cod becomes as successful as salmon. One barrier is the high cost of producing 
cod fry. Another is the declining number of suitable sites for aquaculture in general 
(www.netfisk.no, 06.01.2003).  
The main idea behind this thesis is that “space” is not only “a region of the 
earth’s surface” (Hornby, 1986). With respect to aquaculture, space will therefore 
include the physical occupation of a farm, plus the area “confiscated” by the farm, 
which excludes other types of uses. What is more, space is also a result of various 
socially constructed discourses related to regional policy, industry structure, health 
and environmental issues, and coastal policy. 
Value-added activities in the marine sector are predicted to increase from 35 
billion NOK in 2001 to 150 billion NOK by 2020. The majority of the economic 
activities will take place in the coastal zone (Seterås, 2001; Sandbæk, 2003:64). 
Access to suitable area in the coastal zone is the basic requirement for continued 
growth and development of aquaculture. In 1993, Heen et al. claimed, “The future of 
the salmon farming industry is not limited by the availability of suitable sites for 
production….”. This is an essential assumption, if we are to increase production as 
predicted. However, is this assumption realistic?  
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It has been argued that the total number aquaculture net pens, if placed on the 
Gardermoen International Airport, will only occupy one runway (Sandbæk, 2003:65). 
Thus, considering the long coastline and the large area within the baseline (90 000 
km2), it is not surprising some actors have difficulties to fully comprehend that space 
may be limited.  Moreover, technocrats argue for almost an unlimited aquaculture 
expansion - depending upon technological solutions. Similarly, space is not seen as a 
limiting factor by the technological foundation SINTEF1 as they state, “Terrestrial 
areas are now fully utilized, and one does not expect limited space in the ocean” 
(Sandbæk, 2003:63). 
On the other side, actors such as Per Chr Holm in the Directorate of Fisheries 
argue that, with the present organization of the aquaculture industry, space will 
become a scarce input factor. A normal permit for salmon is presently at 12 000 m3 
and has a surface area of 2 800 m2 (White Paper no. 43 (1998-99); Sandbæk, 
2003:55,65). With a minimum requirement of one km between farms, a farm occupies 
at least an area of about 0.785 km2. If we use five km between farms, then each farm 
will occupy 19.5 km2. In addition, each license needs between 2 and 3 localities for 
periodical abandonment (see appendix 2). The area within the Norwegian baseline is 
90 000 km2. Using five km as a minimum requirement will allow for 4 600 localities. 
In 2001, there were about 3 000 localities for salmon, trout, rainbow trout, shell fish 
and marine fish in Norway – salmon alone occupy 1 700 localities. This calculation, 
however, does not include the introduction of National Salmon Fjords and the planned 
marine conservation areas. Thus, depending upon the discourses being utilized and its 
accepted requirements and considerations, the predictions of spatial scarcity may be 
fulfilled. Moreover, a growth as the one predicted above, may seem somewhat 
unrealistic – given the existing technology (Seterås, 2001; Sandbæk, 2003:65).  
The discussion between the “optimist” and the “pessimist” has primarily been 
centred on technology. Obviously, the type of aquaculture technology determines 
where a farm can be located. With new technology (larger and/or submergible pens) 
aquaculture may be able to move farther ashore, thus escaping spatial limitations and 
some conflicting interests. However, the question of space is more than a technical 
                                                          
1 The Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research at the Norwegian University 
of Science and Technology: NTNU. 
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question. The requirements put upon the salmon industry are also the results of social 
processes – requirements are socially constructed. This is evident if we compare 
Norwegian aquaculture industry with those in other countries, for instance, Chile, 
United Kingdom or Ireland, where spatial requirements are different.  
Hence, whether there is scarcity of space or not, depends also on how the 
discourse over space has been framed, which demands have been accepted and how 
these demands have been transformed into minimum requirements through laws, 
regulations and practices.  
One of the questions in Norwegian aquaculture 
that needs answering is whether or not space is scarce, 
given the present technology. To answer this question, 
a number of subordinate questions need answering: 
1. How has the physical use of space changed 
in Norwegian aquaculture since the early 
1970?  
2. To what extent can these changes (in 
spatial use) be traced back to social discourses, that is, to various 
discussions relating to the development of the aquaculture industry? 
To answer these two questions another four questions need answering: 
3. How has policies related to the use of space in aquaculture been 
represented from 1970 onwards? 
4. What types of actors and interests have influenced the development of 
these policies? 
5. To what extent have the various discourses resulted in laws, regulations 
and practices affecting the aquaculture industry? 
6. Finally, to what extent can coastal zone management (CZM) be seen as an 
attempt to harmonize various competing interests and discourses? 
The paper is organized as follows: in chapter 2, the methodology and the theory used 
in this paper will be presented. In chapter 3, the paper will briefly wander through the 
history of Norwegian aquaculture from the 1970s to the present. Chapter 4 to 7 divide 
the whole period into different eras and examine spatial development in each era. In 
chapter 8, Integrated Coastal Zone Management will be presented and a few key 
interests in the coastal zone will be examined. Chapter 9 will provide a discourse 
analysis of spatial use in aquaculture, before concluding.  
 
 Fish farm on Måløy. 
 
Photo: Tor Jarild 
Source: Aftenposten, 14.05.2001 
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Chapter 2: Methods and Theory 
This paper is, in general, founded upon qualitative materials collected through 
literature review, including public documents and archives. Secondary literature, such 
as research, newspaper and academic periodicals, was actively used. Some texts have 
been more central than others, such as certain Odelsting Propositions and White 
Papers. Berge (2001) was central in developing the historical developments in 
aquaculture and Neumann (2001) provided the basis for the theory.  
The document analysis was supplemented by interviews of a few key actors, 
such as regional veterinary for Troms and Finnmark, Einar T. Karlsen; as well as Ulf 
Magne Nilssen at the Ministry of Fisheries, Ingebrigt Austevoll fisheries advisor in 
the municipality of Austevoll, and Pål Erik Jensen at the Norwegian Animal Health 
Authority. These interviews, however, do not qualify as scientific interviews.  
The graphs used in chapter 8, are only relative numbers. The idea is to 
illustrate how different actors perceive conflicts in the coastal zone. 
The paper is limited to salmonid aquaculture in sea. I am aware of the spatial 
implication smolt and fish processing plants may have; however, that is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Hence, this paper does not discuss any matter dealing with smolt, 
sea ranching or other species than salmonids. 
The analysis had a main focus upon the written word, especially public 
documents. However, discourses tend to exist orally prior to publications, e.g. within 
political parties. Discourses may also exist abroad, before they are introduced in 
Norway; these perspectives are also outside the scope of this paper. Another 
limitation is related to translation. I translated most of the documents from Norwegian 
to English, this therefore influence the text.  
The timeframe of the paper is set to the period 1970 to 2003 and the spatial 
limit is Norwegian aquaculture. The timeframe was chosen because modern 
aquaculture, with eight-sided sea pens, took off in the seventies. The year 1970 is also 
an important year, as Norwegian Fish Farmers’ Association (NFF) was established 
this year. Moreover, the first temporary aquaculture act was implemented in 1973. 




This paper will present the main aspects of discourse analysis: analysis of 
regularities in expression to identify discourses; analysis of the actors producing, 
reproducing and transforming discourses; and spatial impacts and policy outcomes of 
discourses (based on Adger et al, 2001).  
Discursive formations in aquaculture policy covered in this paper focus on 
spatial issues, thus the analysis deliberates on the spatial implications of the different 
discourses. In describing the discourses, data concerning the three aspects with an 
emphasis on identifying the characteristics of the discourses and the spatial impacts 
and outcomes will be presented. The analysis will use Neumann’s three steps (2001) 
to develop a model of the discourse.  
Adger et al (2001) define discourses broadly as “a shared meaning of 
phenomena”. They specify that: 
“These phenomena may be small or large; and small or large 
groups on local, national, international or global level may share 
the understanding. The actors promoting the discourse participate 
in various degrees to its production, reproduction and 
transformation through written and oral statements” (Adger et al, 
2001:683) 
Based on Foucault (1972) “discourses will be viewed as a broader set of 
linguistic practices embedded in networks of social relations and tied to narratives 
about the construction of the world” (Hovden and Lindseth, 2002:2). Discourses 
enclose a body of expressions in which we can find homogeneity in message as well 
as in expressive means (Adger et al, 2001:685).  Thus, expressions share a particular 
knowledge and perception of the phenomenon in question, and there may be shared 
beliefs regarding causes of problems and appropriate response.  
Hovden and Lindseth (2002) claim that discourses define the range of policy 
options and operate to empower specific actors and exclude other actors. They also 
serve as a site of resistance, forming counter discourses. Thus, discourses exclude 
some people, as they do not allow certain issues to be raised; only certain people are 
authorized to participate (Hovden and Lindseth, 2002 (Hajer, 1995.49)). 
Allison (1971) states that policies are discursive struggles, rather than a 
product of institutional factors or product of actors’ interests (Hovden and Lindseth, 
2002 (Sabatier, 1999)).  However, without actors to promote discourses and to 
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struggle over them or identify with them, discourses would not exist (Hovden and 
Lindseth, 2002 (Litfin, 1994)). Institutions and individuals can reproduce, maintain 
and be carriers of discourses. The actions of these agents occur within the framework 
of discourses, which exist independently of the intentions or the motive of the agents.  
Discourses are continually reproduced and developed further as central actors 
use discourses to be heard, understood and validated. Discourse analysis will 
therefore be used to deconstruct the aquaculture policy from the 1970s to the present 
and to examine how central actors in public debate relate to and influence the 
discourse context, with a specific focus on space.  
According to Adger et al (2001), within discourse analysis, expressive means 
have been analyzed in terms of narratives (Petersen, 1997), storylines (Hajer, 1995) 
and metaphors, and other rhetorical devices (Dryzek, 1997). In this paper, expressive 
means will be analyzed in terms of narratives. Narratives have two important aspects. 
First, a narrative has a chronological order (beginning, middle and end). Roe, 
for example, defined a ‘development narrative’ that emphasized chronology. He 
focused on political implications of development narratives, for instance the appeal of 
‘tragedy of the commons’ for privatization. Further, Roe stressed that development 
narratives is not necessarily displaced by negative findings, rather he proposed to 
create a ‘counter-narrative’ that tells a better story (Adger et al, 2001 (Roe, 1991, 
1995, 1999)). Thus, this paper will try to develop the narratives in the various 
discourses chronologically and show that various narratives were not displaced. 
Rather, the narratives in each discourse developed a ‘counter-narrative’ that told a 
better story (from the carriers’ point of view), which grew in influence parallel to 
other discourses. Thus, a counter-narrative may, or may not, replace the original 
narrative. In the case of Norwegian fish farming, although counter-narratives became 
increasingly dominant, they never completely replaced the original discourse. The 
original narrative co-existed, but with a weakened position.  
Secondly, a narrative has a particular structure related to an involved “cast” of 
actors. This paper will try to show how a particular set of actors follow a discourse 
from the 1970s to the present, and how some does not. This does not imply that one 
particular discourse is the dominant discourse throughout the entire period. A 
discourse is hegemonic if it dominates thinking and is translated into institutional 
arrangements (Adger et al, 2001). Thus, this analysis will show that the hegemonic 
discourse varies from the beginning of the 1970s to the present. In the 1970s, for 
 13
instance, the hegemonic discourse was focused on regional-policy. Today, the 
hegemonic discourse is based upon health arguments. This paper will find the 
dominating and alternative discourses throughout the development of aquaculture-
policy with respect to space.  
In aquaculture politics, the establishment of key reference points – such as 
concepts, terms and phrases - play a crucial role in terms of reinforcing arguments 
associated with these contextual factors. The power of discourse is to: determine the 
linguistic frame of reference within which the debate takes place. Thus, aquaculture 
policies are struggles between various institutions and political coalitions, where 
politicians, scientists, fish farmers and other interests participate. The participants 
may be divided into groups that maintain and further develop ways of approaching a 
problem – as parts of various discourses  (Hovden and Lindseth, 2002). 
Models are socially reproducible facts, known as representations. 
Representations are things and phenomena the way we perceive them. That is, not the 
thing in itself, but things filtered through what comes between the world and us: the 
language, the categories and so forth. Representations decide what is being sensed and 
communicated and must be repeated with more or less variations. The carriers of the 
same representations are institutionalized in a position in the discourse and promote a 
similar reality. Thus, discourse analysis makes it a scientific assignment to show how 
representations are constituted and diffused, and what variety of different 
representations that at a point in time makes up the discourse (Neumann, 2001). 
 
Neumann’s Three Steps to Discourse Analysis 
To analyse “the discourse of space” in Norwegian aquaculture policy the three 
steps used by Neumann (2001) will be applied.  
 
Step 1: Choosing and Limiting the Discourse 
Humans need models to separate sensed impressions. Social reality exists in 
discourses (in clusters) and one discourse cannot be completely separate from others. 
How we limit the discourse in relation to others is a question of what meaning the 
discourse is given by its carriers. Thus, the scientific assignment is to show the 
affinity and differences between these representations and to demonstrate that these 
belong to the same discourse. This can be shown by demonstrating that the 
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representations shows up in the same text with a certain regularity and that there is an 
affinity in the use of metaphors in them.  
 
Step 2: The Discourses’ Representation 
The second step is to make an inventory of the representations that exist in the 
chosen discourse. Representation is the reality or arguments. It should be noted that 
discourse analysis is built upon an acceptance of uncertainty and conflict between 
representations. 
The chosen discourse often contains a dominating reality of one or more 
alternatives. It is impossible to completely limit a discourse; there is always an influx. 
Also, it is difficult to imagine a discourse completely open over a longer period of 
time. Methodically, we try to find these different representations.  
There are a number of formal and informal practices the carriers use to keep 
up a given limitation of a discourse. That is, what representations are allowed into a 
discourse? Political conflicts between clearly defined positions often find resonance in 
a large number of carriers. Methodically, because politics is a structured activity 
between groups, usually there is a situation where politicizing of a discourse happens 
just when two or more patterns of opinions are isolated. Thus, it should be possible to 
differentiate between opinions that unifies and those that differentiate.  
 
Step 3: The stratifying of the Discourse 
The third step is to identify whether all the features of a representation are 
always the same. Some features unify and some features differentiate. Some features 
are easier to use to define some pattern of opinion than others. This is the assignment 
of the discourse analysis. There is an “inertia” regarding representations of material 
things; accordingly, some representations will be slower to change, e.g. material 
things. It is harder to change the representation of a car, than the driver. The final 
question is then: how does power penetrate and keep up the discourse? How is the 







Chapter 3 - Norwegian Fish Farming: A Brief Historical Overview  
To examine the change in spatial use, this chapter will give a brief historical view 
of the history of Norwegian aquaculture. As the politics of Norwegian aquaculture has 
to a great extent been focused on licensing, this is a natural point of departure. To 
enter the business of fish farming an aquaculture license is required. A license is a 
permit to do something that is generally prohibited (Hallenstvedt et al, 1985 (Eckhoff, 
1984)). This exclusive right to a few chosen applicants limits competition. Moreover, 
competition is limited through volume restrictions. Hence, the licensing system is a 
form of direct regulations of the aquaculture industry. A license in aquaculture is an 
industry-political tool to manage: who is allowed to enter, where to establish and the 
size of farms (Hallenstvedt et al, 1985).  
 
A Foundation is Being Laid (1950s and 1960s)  
This paper focuses on Norwegian fish farming in the period from 1970 to the 
present. Still, there is a need to look back at the beginning of “modern” aquaculture. 
The foundation of modern Norwegian aquaculture was laid in the 1950s. In this 
decade Agricultural farmers were experimenting with rainbow trout in freshwater on 
land, based on Danish technology (Hallenstvedt et al, 1985). They were pioneers with 
a variety of backgrounds and competences (Aarset, 1998; Didriksen, 1987).  
To illustrate the small-scale and experimental nature of Norwegian fish 
farming at the time, Arne Ratchje – a policeman and experimental fish farmer on the 
west coast- heard in1959 about a man who hatched trout fry in a tank. Subsequently, 
Ratchje wanted to try and imported fry from Denmark. The experiment was a success. 
The fry grew so well on a diet of whale liver, that he had to expand his tanks. Next, he 
engorged a small bay with solid cement walls, which allowed for a good influx of 
fresh seawater. Then 5 500 trout fry were released into this dam in 1962. Many died, 
but the survivors got accustomed to the seawater and had an immense physical 
growth. The biology seemed to function well, but there were other obstacles to 
overcome. The reinforcement steel in the cement walls rusted and Ratchje realised he 
had to build free-floating net pens. These pens came to be known as the “Grøntvedt-
cage”, which is the most used net pen today (Ratchje, 1995; Tilset et al 1991).  
The technology of the 1960s was unproven. Most of the production took place 
in ponds along the coast (as described); however, further experiments with sea pens 
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were carried out. Simultaneously, agricultural farmers began commercial aquaculture 
production of trout, as a supplemental income (Vassdal, 2001).  
The investments were relatively small. This trial phase was characterized by 
the lack of commercial character and aquaculture was usually a secondary income. 
The experimenters were generally small entrepreneurs who shared knowledge. Farms 
were geographically spread, using different technologies and making little profit 
(Berge, 2001). At this point in time, the degree of processing was low and the interest 
from the external capital-intensive industry was minimal.  
 
Expansion of Norwegian Fish Farming (the 1970s) 
By the early seventies, a number of small entrepreneurs were experiencing 
good results in the eight-sided net pans – usually no larger than 500 m3. This 
technology resulted in an increased production capacity of saltwater aquaculture. 
Technological expertise and innovations improved, and aquaculture experiments 
expanded and slowly formed into an industry. Thus, the number of fish farmers 
increased and production increased as well (Hallenstvedt et al., 1985). 
There were several reasons for the great expansion in the 1970s:  
1. Aquaculture production moved from land to sea. 
2. Production techniques improved (sea cages) and cost of equipment was 
advantageous. 
3. The market was advantageous; the price of salmon was high. 
4. Norwegian Fish Farmers’ Association (NFF) was established and distributed 
information and knowledge to its members. 
5. Public research institutions started research on aquaculture (Ot.prp. 46 (1972-
73)). 
6. There was a low volume of wild salmon being caught. 
These factors encouraged investments in the aquaculture sector and were the 
preconditions for the take-off in the industry. 
 
The Lysø-Commision and The Start of a Regulation Regime  
In the early 1970s a commission, chaired by Lysø (Minister of Fisheries 1955-
1963), was founded to look at the potential of aquaculture and a possible management 
regimes for the rapidly expanding aquaculture industry. Due to fear of overproduction 
and resulting low profits, the Lysø-commission recognized the urgency to regulate the 
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industry.  The committee proposed a temporary aquaculture act that lasted until 1981.  
The final report of the Lysø-commission (NOU 1977:39) became a major influence 
upon shaping the future of Norwegian aquaculture policy.   
This temporary legislation was characterized by being an industry-political 
regulation with an aim to manage and control Norwegian aquaculture. Thus, the 
objectives were to control production and ensure regional development. A structure 
consisting of small units and “owner-operates” was believed fulfill the objectives of 
the act (Berge, 2001; Bjørndal et al, 1985, Heen et al., 1993).  
Four types of societal considerations were to be maintained. First of all, the 
regime would adjust the total production to the market demand. Second, to regulate 
the number of licenses to smolt production. Third, it would avoid socio-economical 
losses of overproduction. Finally, it would allocate licenses to strengthen the 
economies of rural fjords and coastal areas (Ot.prp. nr. 46(1972 -1973)).  
 
The Allocation Moratorium (1977-1981) 
The licensing system was practiced liberally and functioned more like a 
registration system until 1977, when allocations were temporary stopped. That is, an 
applicant satisfying the requirements with respect to locality, pollution and disease 
was seen as having a legal right to a license (Ørebech, 1988 (Ørebech, 1982); 
Thomassen, 1985). The moratorium lasted until the summer of 1981 (Thomassen, 
1985; Hallenstvedt et al, 1985).  According to Bolle (the Minister of Fisheries for the 
Labour Party from 1973 to 1981), allocations stopped because of deficiency of smolt 
(Ot.prp nr. 30 (1980-81)).  However, according to Listau (Minister of Fisheries for the 
conservative government from 1981 to 1985), the moratorium was implemented 
because of uncertainty with respect to market demand (Ot.prp nr. 53. (1984-85)). The 
Norwegian Fish Farmer Association (NFF), who feared overproduction and negative 
impacts upon existing farmers, supported the moratorium (Hallenstvedt et al, 1985).  
 
Organization of Sales – the Establishment of FOS 
Increased production called for an organizing of sales and marketing. Thus, 
Norwegian Fish Farmers Sales Organizations (FOS) was founded at the annual 
meeting of NFF in 1978. The sales organization consisted of aquaculture producers, 
with the objective to organize firsthand sales of farmed fish. It would also try to 
achieve good and stable prices 
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  There were, prior to the establishment of FOS, discussions regarding what 
legal framework to use: the framework of the fishing industry or the framework of the 
agriculture industry. From the Lysø-commission there were four alternatives put 
forth:  
1. Free sales. The Lysø-commission advised against it, as earlier experiences in 
the sales organization for trout (Norsk Ørretomsetning SL) were negative. 
2. Sales on voluntary basis. The Lysø-commission did not advice to use this 
system either, as a similar system had taken a long time to function in the 
agricultural sector.  
3. Sales under the Raw Fish Act and the existing fisheries sales organizations. 
This was also advised against from the Lysø-commission. The existing 
fisheries sales organizations had the authority to implement moratorium upon 
fishing and this could be disadvantageous to fish farmers. The sales of farmed 
salmon would be organized through six different cooperatives, which could 
lead to problems of coordination. 
4. Firsthand sales by sales organizations organized by the fish farmers and 
protected by law. This was the alternative that the Lysø-commission advised 
to use, which became the FOS (Didriksen, 1987). 
 
The Liberating 80s and the First Permanent Act of 1981 
The first conservative government of Willoch came into office in the early 
1980s. There was an amazing growth from 1980 to 1990 in the aquaculture sector and 
in some years the annual growth exceeded 50%. This increase was partly due to 
increased use of inputs – more localities were opened; however, most of the increase 
was due to technological change (Vassdal, 2001:3). At this point in time, the capital-
intensive industry had a growing interest in the profits being made in aquaculture. 
Simultaneously, laws regulating the financial markets were liberalized.  
The first permanent aquaculture act was implemented in 1981 (15th of May 
1981, no. 19). Due to market imperfections and the use of common property, fish 
farming needed to be regulated through a licensing system (Bjørndal et al, 1985 
(Gravell and Rees, 1981:511)). The permanent law was almost identical to the 
temporary law and was characterized by the central authorities willingness to manage 
and control the industry, as well as regional development (Thomassen, 1985, White 
Paper no. 71 (1979-80)). The aim of the law (from the Lysø-committee) was to spread 
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the volume to get the best regional effects (NOU 1977:39). The decentralized 
structure would consist of small and medium sized farms, localized in rural 
communities and with the owner as the operator. To ensure that farms were placed in 
the districts, certain areas would get a geographic priority, e.g. Northern-Norway 
(Bjørndal et al, 1985 (White paper no. 71, p.42)).  
The first concession round, according to the law of 1981, took part in May 
1981. Licenses were allocated according to a strict regional allocation regime. Even 
during the government of Willoch, which claimed their opposition to a license regime, 
was the licensing system practiced strictly (Ørebech, 1988 (Ot.prp. nr. 53(1984-85)).  
 
An Attempt to Deregulate - the Aquaculture Act of 1985  
A new Aquaculture Act was implemented in 1985. This act, as the previous 
acts, regulated the number, the size, the location and the ownership of farms. The 
main amendments to the law were with respect to smolt production, farming of new 
species and farming of salmon in fresh water. That meant, for instance, it was free 
entrance into “the hatchery business”, if the requirements to environment and health 
were satisfied. The requirement to owner-operator relations was relaxed. Majority 
interests should be only “as far as possible” on local 
hands and could only be held in one farm - to avoid 
large concentrations on the owner side. Minority 
interests could be held in more than one farm (Berge, 
2001; Bjørndal et al, 1985 (Ot.prp 53, 1984-1985); 
Heen et al 1993 (Aarset, 1988)). The requirement to 
adjust to market demand was removed. The objective 
was to balance development to the infrastructure, such 
as: supervisory services, education, training and 
research (Bjørndal et al, 1985; Heen et al, 1993). 
Therefore, although the law was similar to the act of 1981, it was to some extent 
liberalized.  
Due to the general and somewhat opposing objectives in the legislation, there 
was a need for regulations to accompany the act.  These regulations further 
emphasized the regional-political characteristic of the act (Thomassen, 1985).  
At the end of the 1980s the industry was still characterized by small 
entrepreneurs, low vertical integration and local ownership. However, there were 
 
 
 Fish farm in the Folla fjord. 
 
Source: www.fjord.no  
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tendencies of increased industrial ownership and horizontal integration. The bank 
crisis affected the aquaculture business and a number of fish farms went bankrupt and 
the optimism regarding new species declined. As technology improved, the size of the 
farms grew and the density within the pen increased. Thus, environmental pollution 
and disease on the locality became an increasing problem. With an increased focus on 
locality and environmental problems, environmental and veterinary regulations 
became limiting-factor to allocation of licenses. The Ministry of Environment had 
become a production-limiting department (Berge, 2001).  
 
The Re-regulating 1990s 
At the beginning of the 1990s the Labour Party came into office. This 
government continued the deregulations started by the previous conservative 
government. The focus was still on increased and inexpensive production; however, 
due to the resulting overproduction of salmon, there was an increasing pressure from 
the European Union (EU) and the United States (USA) to regulate (Berge, 2001).  
Norwegian producers were accused of dumping by American and 
Scottish/Irish producers. In 1990, the European Commission concluded that dumping 
had taken place. No counter-levy was launched against Norway, but a system to 
freeze the overproduction and a minimum-price-policy was established by the 
Norwegian government that same year. In 1991, the European commission set a 
temporary minimum price and 2% import levy on Norwegian salmon. Similarly, the 
US found Norway “guilty” of dumping and subsidizing, and a tariff of 26% was 
imposed on Norwegian salmon. This terminated the export to the U.S. (Heen et al, 
1993:18; Berge, 2001).  
This conflict led to what Berge (2001) called ”re-regulation”, which 
materialized at first in a temporary feed moratorium (quotas) in 1991. The result was 
a reduction in production in 1991-92 of about 30 000 tonnes (Heen et al, 1993:18; 
Berge, 1985). The monopoly sales organization (FOS) was in financial difficulties 
and started negotiating with government to sell the overproduction to non-commercial 
markets. The government was not willing to support such sales and the sales 
organization went bankrupt. A number of farms also went bankrupt - due to low 
prices and the bankruptcy of FOS. The government and the large producers saw this 
as an opportunity to restructure the aquaculture industry. The sales structure has 
changed and today a number of wholesalers and exporters operate, as opposed to the 
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previous monopoly. Subsequently, there was an increase in both vertical and 
horizontal integration, and also in differentiation of farms (Heen et al, 1993). 
In 1997 the Norwegian producers were once more faced with accusation of 
dumping from the EU. The EU is the most important export market for Norwegian 
farmed salmon. In order to avoid corrective actions from the EU was an agreement 
between the EU and Norway signed (“The salmon agreement”). They agreed to a 
minimum price for Norwegian salmon and a maximum limit on export to the EU 
markets. The intension of the agreement was to regulate the European salmon market. 
To demonstrate the ability to regulate the Norwegian production, feed quota was 
imposed on all producers in Norway (Vassdal, 2001:4). 
 
A First Attempt to Regulate Space: LENKA 
In the mid-1980s, the aquaculture industry struggled with environmental 
problems and economic losses due to disease and escapements.  Furthermore, the fast 
growth in the business called for a well-formulated policy with respect to locality. 
There was a recognition that locality was a limited resource that had to be managed. 
As a result, the project LENKA (NOU 1990:22) was initiated in 1987 (Aarset, 1998).  
LENKA assessed the suitability of the coast for aquaculture. The goal was to 
develop a planning device for industrial development by reviewing interests, 
infrastructure and environmental conditions in the coastal zone. LENKA would, 
additionally, try to simplify procedures, increase involvement of local government 
and provide central government with an overview of total potential capacity for 
coastal aquaculture. LENKA estimated, at the time, a potential increase of 600 000 
tons of farmed fish without detrimental environmental effects (NOU 1990:22). 
 
The History of the Allocations of Farms - An Increase in Size and Numbers 
The temporary Aquaculture Act of 1973 was practiced liberally – until 
October 1977. Only 6 of 97 applications were rejected in the period (Heen et al, 
1993:15 (Aarset, 1988)). The temporary act also regulated the farms size – cage 
volume. In 1973 the maximum size was set at 8 000 m3 (Heen et al, 1993) and 287 
producers produced 171 tons of salmon (Tilset et al., 1991). Although the production 
limit was set to 8 000 m3, there were farms like MOWI that had nearly unlimited 
volume, as they blocked off sounds. The size regulations did not, at the time, apply to 
farms that existed before the law was implemented.  
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The size of the farm was reduced to 5 000 m3 in 1975 and further reduced to   
3 000 m3 in 1981 (Aarset, 1998). In the same period, the production increased to a 
total of 8 418 tons (NHL, 2003). From the 800 applications only 50 were approved. 
The low number of concessions given was due to industry political considerations and 
increased the production capacity by a mere 10% (Thomassen, 1985:43). 
In the spring of 1983 came new and promising signals, 100 concessions were 
allocated at a size of 5 000 m3 (Aarset, 1998:197). At the same time, existing farms 
were permitted to increase their size to 8 000 m3. Hence, the production capacity of 
salmon and trout increased by 70-80% (Thomassen, 1985:43; Ørebech, 1988:14 
(Ot.prp. nr. 53(1984-85)).  
Another round of concessions took place in July 1985. A total of 150 
concessions were allocated at the size of 8 000 m3. This year the total production of 
salmon had risen to 29 473 tons (FHL, 2003).  
The pen volume increased to 12 000 m3 in 1988 and Norwegian farm salmon 
was about 70% of the total production in the world that year (Tilset et al, 1991:2). 
The production increase continued; however, the production actually fell from 1990 
to1992 and so did the Norwegian share of the world.  
From 1992 the production of farmed Atlantic salmon increased again and has 
exploded since 1997, despite stringent regulations.  By the year 2002, the production 
has reached an all time high of 446 000 tons (FHL, 2003).  
To illustrate that the growth has been beyond imagination, the Lysø-
commission estimated that the potential production volume for salmon in 1985 would 
be between 8 000 and 15 000 tons (NOU: 39, 1977). The actual production in 1985 
was close to 30 000 tons. Obviously, aquaculture in Norway has had a growth that 















































Figure 1: Volume of Slaughtered Atlantic Salmon from 1970-2002 in tons (FHL, 2003). 
 
The growth in the aquaculture industry has been based upon three factors: 1) 
there was an existing infrastructure – from wild salmon, 2) workers in the regions 














Chapter 4: The Formation of an Industry (1970 to 1980) 
 In order to analyse the spatial influence of aquaculture in the period from 1970 
to 2003, an examination on the separate eras is essential. The entire period is split into 
four eras: the formative years (1970-1980), the era of growth (1981-1985), the era of 
financial crisis (1986-1991) and the era of health interests (1991-2003). Within each 
era three different elements are discussed: the policy, the actors involved and the 
outcome of the policy.  
 
Small farms and entrepreneurs characterized the aquaculture industry in the 
1970s. A number of entrepreneurs experienced good results with the eight-sided net 
pens, and the total production of salmon increased from 98 tons in 1971 to 4 312 tons 
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Figure 2: Produced Atlantic Salmon 1971-1980 in tons (FHL, 2003). 
 
There were four reasons for the expansion in the 1970s. First of all, farms and 
production techniques developed. Secondly, the price of salmon was advantageous. 
Thirdly, Norwegian Fish Farmers’ Associations (NFF) was established, and 
distributed information and knowledge. Finally, public research institutions started 
research on aquaculture (Ot.prp. no 46 (1972-73)).  
The period from 1970 to 1980 is recognized for one event in particular, the 
temporary Aquaculture Act in 1973. The establishments of (NFF) in 1970 and the 
Fish Farmers Sales Organization (FOS) in 1978 also affected the industry in the 
period. These events established a regime characterized by political selectivity and 
rationality, through limiting entry into the industry. In addition, ties to the Ministry of 
Fisheries were strengthened through legislation in the period (Berge, 2001).  
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The regime was a result of political conflicts and compromises. The central 
arena for these conflicts was the Lysø-commission, established in 1972. The Lysø-
commission laid, according to Hersoug and Holm (1992), the premises for the future 
aquaculture politics. The commission would evaluate the possibilities that artificial 
hatching and aquaculture developed into a vital industry, including organization of it 
(Berge, 2001).  
The Lysø-commission observed the rapid growth in the industry and the need 
to regulate its development. Hence, they proposed a temporary Aquaculture Act in 
1973. The temporary Aquaculture Act of 1973 introduced a license regime into the 
aquaculture industry. The objectives were, first of all, to strengthen the economies of 
coastal communities by increasing employment, through allocating licenses to 
economically weaker rural regions. Secondly, they wanted small-scale industry 
structure and promoted small and medium sized farms. These objectives would be 
achieved by: limiting the number licenses, regulating the ownership and limiting the 
size of the farms. The act would also try to balance the production of farmed salmon 
with the marked demand. An unregulated production would result in overproduction 
and a downward pressure upon price. This in turn would lead to bankruptcies and 
negative regional effects (NOU 1977:39). 
The objectives were further stressed through the regulations and contained 
absolute requirements that had to be satisfied to receive a permit. A permit would not 
be given if: 
a) There was a risk for spreading disease. 
b) There was a risk of polluting.  
c) The technical standards were not satisfied. 
d) The farm had a poor location. 
The commission suggested a quantity (ton) regulation on production of salmon 
and rainbow trout. This became a central conflict and was, as suggested by the 
Directorate of Fisheries, not included in the temporary of 1973. Rather, production 
was regulated through volume limitation and were in 1973 set to 8 000 m3 
(Forskrifter, 1973).  This regulation continued until January 1975 when the limit was 
reduced to 5 000 m3, and further reduced to 3 000 m3 in 1981- for new entrants, 
existing farms were exempt. It ought to be mentioned, at this point in time, there were 
no clear aversion towards non-local ownership of aquaculture farms.  
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The temporary Aquaculture Act was practiced liberally, until the moratorium 
in 1977. Only 6 out of 97 aquaculture applications were rejected (Aarset, 1998:197) 
on the accounts of risk of disease or pollution (Heen et al, 1993:15 (Aarset, 1988)). 
Private applications that fulfilled the requirements (§2) with regards to disease, 
pollution, technology and location were seen as having a legal right to issue a license 
(Ørebech, 1988:13 (Ørebech, 1982), Thomassen, 1985).  
 
Actors and interests 
The political conflicts regarding ministerial affiliation arose when actors from 
two sectors entered the scene: those tied to fisheries and those tied to agriculture. Fish 
farmers were, due to historical ties to the seine fisheries, “representatives” of the 
fisheries sector.   
Fish farmers wanted farms large enough to run an economic efficient 
operation as a full-time occupation. They did not want an industrial-like structure.  
Nevertheless, the production limitations must have been a handicap to many fish 
farmers, especially to those already planning expansion, as such limits would hinder 
the natural advance in the industry – into larger units (Berge, 2001). Moreover, 
requirement regarding disease, pollution, technical standards and location would 
ensure a small-scale structure (Ot.prp. no. 46 (1972-73)). Aquaculture had, because of 
its nature, to take place in the rural regions. Regulations would hinder farms in taking 
advantage of the growing experience to improve efficiency and market conditions, 
and obstruct the competitiveness of the industry. Hence, fish farmers opposed the 
regional-political arguments used in favour of production regulations (Ot.prp. no. 46 
(1972-73)). 
The representative of Norwegian Fishermen’s Association (Norges Fiskarlag) 
in the commission, Sivert Grøntvedt, did not have the same reservations to a 
production restriction as the fish farmers. His association saw maximum allowable 
size as a tricky issue, and thought the development of aquaculture should maximize 
benefits in the districts. 
Regarding production, the Director of Fisheries claimed the limit was set too 
low, but it was only a temporary act. He also suggested giving dispensations to the 
production regulation (Berge, 2001).  
The Ministry of Fisheries did not want an industrial structure, but emphasised 
the difficulties in setting an upper limit to size. The allocation regime chosen would 
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strengthen the economies of coastal regions, they claimed. Many small farms, rather 
than one large farm, would achieve the political objectives. They also asserted that 
marked demand and regional considerations, as well as economical and technical 
requirements should be evaluated when allocating licenses. 
Although the agricultural sector agreed with the proposed temporary law, they 
perceived the volume limitation to be set too high. For the best regional effects, 
aquaculture had to become a side-occupation tied to agriculture. If the farm size was 
set too high, a smaller number of actors would be able to enter the business (Ot.prp 
no. 46 (1972-73)).  
Principally, the environmental interests supported the proposed act. However, 
there were already farms exceeding the suggested maximum limitation and a volume 
limitation would be impractical to control production. Smaller, usually economically 
weaker farms would have difficulties in sustaining losses. The Ministry of 
Environment was, therefore, in doubt regarding the maximum limit, but claimed that 
socio-economical and regional-political consideration points in the direction of 
production limitations. 
As a result of the opposing interests, the Lysø-commission’s proposal was a 
compromise. The general pattern was that opinions of the agriculture sector opposed 
those of the fisheries sector. Thus, three models seemed to evolve in aquaculture: the 
Agriculture-model, the Coastal-model and the Industrial-model. The first model was 
supported and argued for by the agriculture sector. Aquaculture should be a side-
occupation to agriculture and farms should be small and regional. The second model, 
the Coastal-Model, would counteract declining traditional fisheries. Thus, fishers and 
fish processors should have a priority. Owner should operate the farm and the size 
should be adequate for an economical operation. Still, the industry should not have an 
industry-like characteristic. Allocations would depend upon the regional need for 
employment. Finally, the Industrial-Model had its ties and supporters externally 
among the capital-intensive industry and internally among the large-scale producers. 
It would allow industrial interest to enter the aquaculture business to improve 
economic and market competence. No restrictions on size or ownership would be 
necessary and farms would be located were it would be most profitable. This model 
opposed a concession (licensing) system, and argued that standards with respect to 
technology, environment, and disease would be satisfactory (Hallenstvedt et al, 1985). 
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The majority of the commission rejected the Agriculture-model, as well as the 
Industrial-Model. The Coastal-model dominated in the 1970s.   
  
The Spatial Outcome of the Temporary Act of 1973 
The direction of Norwegian aquaculture policy was laid by the Lysø-
commission. The majority of this commission favoured the Coastal-Model and the 
discourses centred on regional development. Ot.prp. no. 46 (1972-73) - resulting in 
the temporary act of 1973, and NOU 1977:39 - the final report of the Lysø-
commission,  were both influential public documents that lead to the 
institutionalization of the Regional-Policy (RP) discourse.  
The NFF was, at the time, in support of a policy based upon the Industrial-
Model and the Industrial-Policy (IP) discourse. The fishermen’s’ organizations were 
not clear on their choice of discourse, but was influenced by both the RP- and the IP-
discourse. The Ministry of Fisheries and the agricultural interests were a part of the 
RP-discourse; however, they had different approaches. The Ministry of Fisheries tied 
aquaculture to the fisheries sector, whereas the agricultural interest tied aquaculture to 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the agricultural sector. The industry was included in a 
discourse that integrated aquaculture in a regional-policy context, where none of the 
actors saw space as a potential problem. Hence, scarcity of space was not yet an issue. 
Thus, starting in 1970, the first sea-based aquaculture farms did not represent 
any significant problem with respect to space. This can be illustrated through the 
liberal practice of the law and its regulations. Due to the liberal practice, farms were 
normally situated outside the land area owned by the farmer or on a locality controlled 
by family, friends or business partners. At the time nobody foresaw a conflict over sea 
space.  
One important reason for the low level of conflict over space was the fact that 
a large numbers of fish farmers were former fishers or they combined fish farming 
and processing. In addition, nearly all the operators were locally based; aquaculture 
was perceived as a “salvation” for small, peripheral communities where traditional 
fisheries were declining. Fish farmers were a part of the community and no one, 
except for occasional protests form recreational interests (farming disturbing the 
views from their cabins), would try to limit the new industry by focusing on conflicts.   
With the license regime in place, space gradually developed to be a key factor. 
Not only did the first operators discover that some locations were better than others 
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(exposure and interchange of water), but the regional policy aspects implied a 
spreading of farms all along the coast. Even if one of the main objectives of the 
regime was related to market demand, the result was many, small farms in a large 
number of municipalities.  
However, some local fishing administrations saw the threat of the moratorium 
in 1977, registering a large number of farms just before the temporary closure. The 
municipality of Austevoll, just outside Bergen, submitted 40 applications when the 
moratorium was introduced (Austevoll, 27.03.2003).  Thus, a number of operators had 
as early as 1977 started to feel the problems of few good localities.  
The moratorium stunted the growth of aquaculture in northern Norway, which 
at the time had most space available. However, the permanent act in 1981 and the 
accompanying regulations, introduced a stricter regime regarding space (see chapter 
six).  
Although production regulations intended to keep a small-scale and 
regionalized structure, one may question the efficiency of this. The maximum 
allowable volume was in 1974 set to 8 000 m3 (Aarset, 1998:197). However, the 
average size of farms receiving licenses was in 1974 only 3 000 m3 - under half of 
maximum allowable volume (Berge, 2001:132). Thus, technology was the factor that 
ensured a small-scale industry, neither politics nor legislation.  
There was a decentralized profile of the industry throughout the decade. The 
regional pattern was mainly because of two factors: environmental requirements and 
gear skills. Aquaculture required clean and sheltered water found in remote fjords and 
the technological transformation into sea net-pens introduced seine fishermen into the 
business. Seine fishermen were settled along the coast; hence, competence also 









Chapter 5: An Era of Growth and Attempts to Liberalize  
 (1981 to 1985) 
There was a continued growth in production in the 1980s. Production rose 
from 8 418 tons in 1981 to 29 473 tons in 1985 (NHL, 2003). Although the 
production increase was primarily due to increased net pen volume; increased number 
of entrants, as well as improved knowledge, experience, research and education also 
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Figure 3: Produced Atlantic Salmon 1980-1985 in tons (FHL, 2003). 
 
A Permanent Policy and the First Liberalizing Influences 
The Lysø-commission’s final report was delivered in February 1977. The 
commission saw an increased need to regulate and direct the development and 
proposed the temporary act to be made permanent (NOU 1977:39).  
The basis for the new act was the White Paper no. 71 (1979-80). The objective 
was to achieve maximum social benefits by creating employment in rural areas. 
Spreading farms along the coast, as well as geographic prioritizing, would realize this 
objective. Additionally, adjustments of production to market demand was upheld. As 
a result, the main characteristics of the temporary act continued into the new act. The 
issues discussed in this white paper were formulated into a law proposal (Ot.prp. no. 
30 (1980-81)). The main objective of the Act of 15th of May 1981 was of an industry-
policy nature. The emphasis would be on: 
1. Balance between production and marked demand. 
2. Economically feasible farms.  
3. Maximum benefits to rural regions. 
4. Safe and good employment. 
5. An ownership structure based on “owner-operates”. 
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As in the temporary act, some absolute requirement had to be satisfied to issue a 
license. Licenses should not be issued if: 
1. The farm presented a hazard for spreading of disease. 
2. The farm presented a hazard for pollution. 
3. The farm had a poor location or was not technically satisfactory, or if, 
4. Societal interests indicated such (e.g. recreational fisheries). 
Temporary regulations of 1981 further emphasised the objectives of the act. 
The regulation focused on situating farms in regions with little present and/or future 
economic activities. Activities tied to agriculture, fisheries and fish processing should 
not be disqualifying for issuing a licence, and persons or firms with significant 
industrial activities of another type should not issue licences. (Ot.prp. no. 30 (1980-
81)).  
The maximum allowable size was, through the temporary regulations set to 
3 000 m3. The reduction was due to increased density; smaller volume grew the same 
amount of fish. Moreover, sizes of about 5 000 m3 had proven to be more profitable. 
Thus, decreasing the size would have no economic consequences (Ot.prp. no. 30 
(1980-81)).  
The first permanent regulation was implemented in 1983 and was similar to 
that of 1981. This regulation emphasized localizing farms to economically weaker 
areas, but was more explicit in the objective to use licenses to compensate for 
declining capture fisheries. (Berge, 2001). The maximum allowable size was set to 
5 000 m3 (Midlertidige forskrifter, 1983).  
 
Actors and Interests in the 1981 Act 
The Ministry of Fisheries stated, in White Paper no. 71 (1979-80), two main 
reasons for a license regime: to adjust production to market demand, and to distribute 
and organize production to achieve the greatest regional effects. As a regional-policy 
tool, the Ministry recommended a work intensive structure. The more jobs a given 
production volume created, the better. Although small-scale production was preferred, 
a feasible economy and income would also be taken into consideration when setting 
farm dimensions. The arguments of the Ministry were contradicting, as they wanted 
both small-scale and economies of scale. 
The Ministry alleged that ownership structure greatly influences regional 
effects; thus the owner was essential. There should, as far as possible, be an owner-
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operator structure. Licenses should not be allocated to persons or companies with 
significant owner interests in other farms and exclude those speculating in the 
industry (Berge, 2001). 
The representatives of the fish farmers in the Lysø-committee opposed 
production regulations and envisaged a dynamic business with an industry-like 
characteristic. The NFF did not see external capital as a threat. The NFF also 
maintained its aversion to production limitations. For established farmers, limitation 
would have negative effects and stop expansion of farms that were close to the 
maximum limit. Another concern was that newcomers would start with large 
capacities and cause overproduction. The NFF opposed using aquaculture as an 
instrument for regional-policy. Focusing solely on regional benefits of aquaculture 
would make the industry more regional- and socio-political, than industry- and 
fishery-political. Thus, not paying attention to the needs of the industry, such policies 
could endanger the foundation of the business and result in a non-sustainable 
development. The NFF had to make a compromise. NFF feared over-establishment 
and wanted to regulate entrance into the business. Thus, to limit entrance, the farmers 
had to compromise and agree to production regulations (Berge, 2001).  
The Farmers’ Association (Bondelaget) linked fish farming to agriculture, as 
this would generate valuable employment. This included a complete integration of 
aquaculture into agriculture – also administratively. NFF asserted that fish farming 
could not, due to the capital and risk involved, be a side-occupation (Berge, 2001).  
The most influential response came from the Directorate of Fisheries. The 
amendments to industry-policies were taken from the report of this directorate. The 
feedback concerned two issues: ownership regulations, and regional-policies.  
Ownership regulations included: local ownership, limited numbers of ownerships and 
owner-operator requirements. In addition, a person could not have significant owner 
interests in other industries, had to reside in the municipality/region and had to be 
active in the operation. The directorate suggested geographic requirements, as 
expansion in aquaculture had been slow north of Vesterålen. Hence, the directorate 
proposed specific criteria for Northern Norway - such as exemption of production 
limitations. The directorate also recommended establishing fish farms in conjunction 
with smaller fish processing plants to strengthen community economies. A 
competitive industry had to be secured, where settlement in the rural regions through 
employment in the new industry was a key. Subsequently, the director questioned 
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whether a size of 8 000 m3 ensured a profitable operation; hence argument of 
aquaculture as a side-occupation was eliminated (Berge, 2001). 
The Parliamentary Committee for Shipping and Fisheries agreed, in general, 
with the Ministry of Fisheries. However, the Conservative Party’s members (Eian, 
Listau and Talleraas) wanted to abolish the license system and replace it by an 
approval and registering system. Subsequently, they proposed the discontinuation of 
the industry-policies – except regional policies, and suggested removing production 
adjustments and societal considerations (Innst.O. no. 31 (1980-81)).  
The Ministry of Fisheries’ proposal was implemented on 15th of May 1981 
(Innst.O. no. 31 (1980-81)). One should notice, as opposed to the act of 1973, this 
time there was an opposition. The opposition was in a liberalizing direction and the 
source was the Conservative Party - the minority (Berge, 2001). The aquaculture 
legislation was still motivated by regional-policy considerations, whose narratives still 
had a hegemonic position in aquaculture politics. The RP-discourse therefore 
regulated the political rhetoric in the industry.  
One should also notice, the arguments of the agriculture sector were not an 
issue - neither in the Parliament nor the Odelsting proposition.  
 
The First Attempt to Deregulate 
From 1981 had politics and management an increased influence upon the 
development of the industry. The existing law was seen to be too limited, as there 
were production and ownership regulations. The institutional system and practices 
excluded investors from the key resources: the site. As a result, the industry’s 
innovations were marginal in the mid 1980s and price-volume mechanisms led to 
situations were producers produced at a loss (Aarset, 1998).  
Thor Listau, of the Conservative Party, became Minister of Fisheries in the fall 
of 1981 and started to work toward liberalization of the Act. This work led to a new 
Aquaculture Act in 1985. Listau presented the first signal of shifts in aquaculture 
policies at the annual meeting of the NFF in 1982. He wanted to remove the industry-
policy requirements and replace these with an approval system that would ensure 
environmental, veterinary and other necessary conditions - it was not a government 
task to adjust production to markets. The explicit regional consideration was toned 
down. Aquaculture was, no matter what, a regional industry. Instead of a work 
intensive line, Listau focused on an economical and rational operation. The best 
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regional effects would come if aquaculture developed into a profitable and vital 
industry. Artificial attempts to distribute the industry could damage the business in the 
long term (Berge, 2001:204 (Norsk Fiskeoppdrett, 1982)).  
The size of the farms had, according to Listau, to be between 8 and 10 000 m3. 
This was drastic compared to the limits set the previous year - 3 000 m3. Still, it is 
worth noting, Listau wanted production limitation and regulation of ownership was 
not removed. Rather the law would secure capital and an owner structure where 
operators owned the farms - in general.  
 
The Hearing in 1982 
Based on Listau’s work, a preliminary hearing was presented in November 1982. 
The contents of the hearing were in general:  
a) Eradication of the licensing system and introduction of an approval system 
with stricter requirements to pollution and veterinary conditions.  
b) Operators would hold at least 51% of the owner interests, but this requirement 
could be bypassed, if local interests held 51% of the interests. 
c) Majority shares in more than one farm would not be allowed, but there would 
be no limitations to minority interests.   
d) An upper limit of 10 000 m3. 
e) The specific regional-policy objectives were removed. There was no need for 
specific public mechanisms to achieve effects beyond those related to water 
quality, pollution, navigation, traffic and so on.  
The majority of the institutions in the hearing wanted to keep the existing 
licensing regime. The Director of Fisheries was critical to deregulating the act and 
removing industry policies, but production regulations had never been used to actually 
regulate production. The only effect the existing regime had was to distribute new 
farms to particular areas. Further, they advised the Ministry of Fisheries to keep the 
existing ownership regulations (Berge, 2001).  
NFF and FOS wanted regulation of production and they emphasised the 
importance of adjusting expansion to infrastructure (Berge, 2001:207 (Norsk 
Fiskeoppdrett nr. 12 1982)). They suggested a maximum allowable volume of 8 000 
m3, as the industry did not master the technology and limits had to be set accordingly. 
The priority should be to expand existing farms, rather than allocating new licenses. 
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NFF supported the suggested amendments to ownership structure, but they wanted to 
limit the number of minority interests. 
A total of 108 municipalities and 11 counties commented on the hearing and the 
majority opposed deregulating industry-policies, as they feared overproduction and 
price drop. They focused on allocating to economically weaker regions to benefit 
agriculture and capture fisheries (Berge, 2001). 
The Ministry of Local Government, through the Regional Development Bank, 
opposed liberalization of ownership regulations.  
The negative response of the hearing was a great disappointment to the 
Conservative Party. The party’s Petter Thomassen explained the result with the 
traditional composition of the hearing institutions. There was a lack of voices that 
could have brought new perspectives into the issue (Thomassen, 1985 s 44). 
 
Liberalising and Compromising 1984-1985 
The existing act of 1981 was in 1984 still seen as being too restrictive, when a 
draft of a new aquaculture act was distributed. The Ministry of Fisheries found 
aquaculture licenses to be necessary, but industry-policy requirements were removed. 
Annual allocations would ensure a balanced growth - understood as the size of the 
industry related to its infrastructure. Geographic priority would secure a wide 
dispersion and regional development. Operators should hold majority interests and 
51% of the ownership should, as far as possible, be tied to local interests. This could 
be bypassed if the majority interests were on local hands. “Local” was defined as 
within the same county/region as the farm. Local ties would stimulate personal 
interests and responsible operation; requirements to technical standards were 
unnecessary. The industry was capital intensive and risky; too stringent requirements 
to ownership could make access to new capital difficult, thus there were no limits to 
minority interests. However, to avoid concentration of ownership, majority interests 
could only be held in one farm. Societal interests should be taken care of by other 
legislation and was removed (Ot.prp. no. 53 (1984-85)). 
The Ministry’s political administration claimed there was a need for 
competence from external, industrial interests. The secretary of state, Munkejord, 
argued that Norwegian aquaculture should take advantage of the large companies’ 
competence. Large firms could be the ones to bring the industry forward, he claimed. 
(Berge, 2001). Production restriction was no longer believed to be the proper tool for 
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market adjustments, which should be taken care of by the industry itself. Thus, the 
aim of the new act was to ensure a balanced development and a profitable and vital 
industry (Ot.prp. no. 53 (1984-85)).  
This law had, as the previous, absolute conditions that had to be satisfied. 
Licenses should not be given if: 
1. The farm presented a hazard for the dispersion of diseases to fish and shellfish. 
2. The farm presented a hazard for pollutions. 
3. The farm had clearly a poor location relative to surrounding environments and 
legal traffic or other use of the area.  
The Ministry of Fisheries wanted a balanced development of the industry; 
entrance was regulated and a limited number of licenses were to be allocated. The 
ministry would give guidelines for how to allocate and the following characteristics 
should be emphasized: 
a. That the industry contributed to a positive development in the regions and for 
the industry.  
b. That majority interests would be, as far as possible, local. 
c. That the operator had the necessary competence. 
Although the Aquaculture Act of 14th of June 1985 represented a deregulation, 
salmon and trout kept its existing licensing system. The industry-political objectives 
were kept - both with respect to market adjustment and infrastructure, and the regional 
focus was kept. Ownership regulations were also kept, but these were somewhat 
liberalized. Operators did not have to own or have majority interests, but ownership 
was, as far as possible, to be tied to “local” or regional majority interests. Nobody 
could hold majority interests in more than one farm, without special considerations. 
 
Regulations of 1985 
The characteristics of the regulations of 1983 were repeated in the regulations of 
1985, though more general and moderate. The motivation was to keep the close ties to 
the fisheries sector. Thus, a significant numbers of licenses were given to firms in the 
traditional fisheries sector (White paper no. 65 (1986-87):40)). The regulations 
emphasize regional-policy and stated that: 
1) Farms should be placed in economically weaker regions, where regional 
effect would be maximized.  
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2) Applicants with ties to local industry, for instance fish processing plants, 
should be prioritized, if this would benefit local activities.  
3) Active participation by the applicant should be emphasised 
4) The applicant should, as far as possible, have the necessary professional 
competence (Forskrift, 1985).  
These regulations were applied in the allocations in 1985. Therefore, in the light of 
these regulations, there was not a significant practical liberation of ownership 
regulations. Further, according to Berge (2001), the interpretation of the Directorate 
of Fisheries was still in the direction of increased regulation and did not represent a 
shift in paradigm.  
In 1985 was the total number of applicants 2000. Of this 150 approved and 70 
licenses went to Northern Norway (excluding Namdalen). As a result, the number of 
licenses increased from 307 in 1981 to 562 in 1985  (Aarset, 1998; Berge, 2001:174).  
The allocations of 1981, 1983 and 1985 represented a relative shift of the aquaculture 
business towards the north. The regional shift meant that the industry’s ties to 
traditional fisheries were at least not weakened (Berge, 2001). The maximum size 
from 1980 to 1985 was set between 3 000 and 8 000 m3. However, up to 1984, the 
size of licenses granted were only between 3 000 and 5 000 m3 (Heen et al, 1993:15) 
 
Actors and Interests in 1985 
The Odelsting Proposition was sent on a hearing in March 1985 (Ot.prp. no. 
53 (1984-85)). The final proposal was “a total evaluation of the growth and 
development of the industry, including market conditions”. Thus, it included an 
industry regulation, similar to previous acts. 
The proposed removal of industry-regulations was the most marked changes in 
the new act. Due to concerns of overproduction, the majority of the institutions in the 
hearing wanted production regulations. The Fisheries Director opposed the removal of 
industry regulations; he did not see the existing act, the way it had been practiced, as a 
genuine regulation of production. The only effect could have been a geographic 
prioritizing.  
 
The Norwegian Fish Farmer’s Association (NFF) agreed to the removal of 
industry-policies, but wanted a total evaluation of the market; infrastructure was just 
as important as marked demand. NFF was critical to liberalization of ownership. It 
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would undermine the fundaments of the industry as a regional industry, if it were 
opened up for external capital and unlimited minority interests (Innst.O. no. 94 (1984-
85)).  
The Directorate of Fisheries was, just as in 
1982, critical to deregulation of the act and to the 
changes in ownership regulations (Berge, 2001).  
The Regional Development Bank still 
opposed liberalization with regards to industry-policy 
and ownership. An overproduction could be risky; 
hence, marked conditions also had to be evaluated. 
The existing ownership structure strengthened the 
industry, as it kept it as a regional industry (Berge, 2001).  
The Ministry of Local Government and Administration delivered this time its 
own comments; however, these opposed those of the Regional Development Bank.  
The Ministry of Local Government and Administration, led by Conservative Party, 
was positive to the liberalistic tendencies. The marked would ensure maximum 
benefit for society, they claimed. A license system would result in fewer farms than 
socio-politically optimal, and would not benefit rural regions. Liberalization of 
ownership was essential to allow large actors to satisfy the need for competence and 
capital (Berge, 2001).  
The Ministry of Environment opposed to the removal of societal interests. In 
addition to the proposal, licenses should not be issued when: 
1. The farm conflicted with the plans in the Plan and Building Act. 
2. The farm was poorly located or technically unsatisfactory. 
3. The farm presented a hazard for important salmon populations and freshwater 
fish, or was expected to impose a significant damage or disadvantage to 
outdoors recreation or to the environment of animals and plants.  
The Ministry of Fisheries replied by arguing that these considerations were being 
taken care of through the established routines.  
The Ministry of Environment suggested that: When developing the industry, 
the emphasis should be on: 
1. Locating the farms where it would generate the best regional effects. 
2. Ensuring, as far as possible, an ownership structure with local ties. 
3. Ensuring safe and good employment. 
 




4. Securing a production balanced with market demand. 
5. Ensuring the possibility to run a technically sound operation (Innst.O. no. 
94 (1984-85)). 
The Labour Party wanted to keep the industry-policy regulations and 
supported the suggested changes proposed by the Ministry of Environment. This 
represented a narrowing of the 1981 act (Berge, 2001). It should be noted, like the 
other parties, that the Labour Party tied ownership to geography and did not resist the 
liberalization of ownership regulations. The Labour Party’s members in the Shipping 
and Fishing Committee proposed: “No one may own majority interests in more than 
one farm, without specific considerations”(Innst.O. no. 94 (1984-85)). They also 
proposed the following guidelines:  “The Ministry sets the number of licenses to be 
allocated and gives guidelines as how to allocate these, including which districts 
should be prioritised. When allocating licenses, the following should be emphasised:   
a. That the industry contributed to a positive development in the regions and 
for the industry.  
b. That, as far as possible, the industry got an ownership structure where the 
majority interests were owned by one or more specific persons or judicial 
persons with local ties.  
c. That the operator had the necessary competence. 
These actors were obviously very influential, as these amendments were taken into 
the new law.  
 
The Spatial Outcome of the Permanent 1985 Act 
The intention of the Aquaculture Act of 1985 was to contribute to a positive 
development in the regions and the industry, and to ensure an ownership structure 
that, as far as possible, had local ties. A balanced production, which focused both on 
market demand and infrastructure, was introduced. According to Berge (2001), there 
was no major shift in policy with respect to salmon or trout and no liberalization in 
practice, as regional-policy was accentuated in the regulations. Moreover, the 
Directorate of Fisheries (that created and applied the regulations) interpreted the 
legislation very strictly. Although the intention was a more liberal act, the practice 
had become more stringent.  
In light of limited available space in the 1970s and the doubling of aquaculture 
licenses from 1981 to 1985, space was increasingly becoming a limited factor and the 
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potential of conflicts in the coastal zone rose. The maximum allowable volume 
declined and fish density increased, resulting in local pollution and reduced physical 
health of the fish.  
The external capital-intensive industry had, until 1985, efficiently been kept 
out of the aquaculture industry by stringent regulations. Another reason for increased 
conflict in this period was the increased interests and entrance from external 
industries. Local ownership decreased and so did the local tolerance towards 
aquaculture. The chosen policy, however, increased the number of licenses in the 
north, causing internal conflict in the industry as more developed municipalities did 
not receive as many licenses as they applied for.  
The industrial argumentations were heard in the new act, as operators did no 
longer need majority interests, local ties were only “as far as possible”, majority 
interests in more than one farm were allowed in special circumstances, and there were 
no limits to minority interests. This opened for the entrance of industrial interests and 
a more industrial model, which would become more influential in the period between 
1985 and 1991 (see chapter seven). 
When licenses where allocated to Finnmark in 1984, only 2 of 20 concessions 
were given to municipalities that could, in Norwegian terms, be defined as large2. 
Licenses were given to places where most other industrial activates were difficult and 
had problems keeping the population. This was also the case in Troms, Nordland, and 
Nord-Trøndelag. Therefore, is seems the guidelines put forth in White Paper no. 71 
(1979-80) was being practiced (Ørebech, 1988).  
In the 1970s the majority of the farms were located in the south-eastern 
Norway and from the coast of the county of Rogaland to the county of Sør-Trøndelag. 
However, the allocations in 1981 and 1983 favoured the north - 97 of 154 licenses 
went to the north. By 1985, Nordland had become the county with the majority of 
licenses. This development, with the clear change of focal point toward the north and 
towards more peripheral coastal municipalities, would not have been possible without 
public management by the government (Hallenstvedt et al, 1985).  
According to Hallenstvedt et al (1985) the Aquaculture Act has been 
successful in achieving the objectives of regional developments, as it has been 
                                                          
2 The one license allocated to the county of Alta was not given to the town Alta, but to 
Kåfjord, a small town experiencing declining settlement. 
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beneficial to economically weaker coastal municipalities. This is also the only reason 
that the system was continued in the new legislation of 1985. 
The regional-policy interests, such as the Directorate of Fisheries and the 
Labour Party, were influential actors maintaining the narratives of the RP-discourse. 
Thus, although industrial interests and arguments were gaining a stronger position in 
the aquaculture debate, the policy outcome illustrates that the regional development 
discourses were still very influential. The Coastal-Model continued to be the 
dominating model in aquaculture, through limits to production and geographical bias 

































Chapter 6: Financial Crisis (1986 to 1991) 
The total production of salmon increased by a five fold in the period 1985 to 
1991. The production was 29 473 tons in 1985 and in 1991 this had increased to 155 
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Figure 4: Produced Atlantic Salmon 1985-1991 in tons (FHL, 2003). 
 
There was, however, a decline in the number of active licenses between 1990 and 
1991 from 739 to 584; the financial crisis had materialized fully (Berge, 2001:234). 
Almost the entire growth was in production of salmon; trout production declined to 
become marginal by 1991. The growth was partly because of increased number of 
farms. More importantly, it was due to: a rise in maximum volume, an increase in fish 
density and change in method for measuring volume. Firstly, the maximum allowable 
volume increased to 8 000 m3 in 1985 and again to 12 000 m3 in 1989. Secondly, 
production per m3 grew all through the 1970s and the 1980s (NOU 1992:32, p.34). 
Finally, method for measuring net pen volume changed in 1985 and resulted in new 
ways of evading the regulations  – volume was measured only down to 5 m, while 
pens could be 35 m deep (Berge, 2001).  
Increased production of Atlantic salmon was supplemented with good catches 
in the wild salmon fisheries, consequently prices dropped. Price of salmon was halved 
between 1985 and 1991, causing financial crisis in the aquaculture industry (Berge, 
2001).  
The license system for smolt was abolished (Aquaculture Act of 1985) and 
replaced by an approval system. Combined with the deregulations of financial 
policies, the number of smolt producers increased. The number of smolt producers 
grew from 372 in 1985 to 692 in 1988. As a result, 1988 was the first year with 
overproduction of smolt. Hence, the price of smolt dropped and lowered the cost of 
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producing salmon, which in turn gave incentives to further increase production. 
Hence, the overproduction of smolt was an argument for increasing the maximum 
allowable volume to 12 000 m3 in 1989. Due to the financial crisis in the industry, a 
number of larger companies took over the operation of smaller farms with financial 
problems. It was argued, by some people, that the political compromise in the 
Aquaculture Act of 1985 was the reason for the crisis (Berge, 2001).  
The financial crisis resulted in a shift in ownership structure and external 
industrial interests got more involved in aquaculture. Although the crisis changed the 
structure of the industry, it was still characterized by small units, one-license firms, 
low vertical integration and local ownership in the early 1990s (Berge 2001 (Holm et 
al, 1990, Berge and Bjarnar 1998)). 
 
A First Stunted Step Towards Deregulation 
White Paper no. 65 (1986-87) was released in June 1987. This paper was, 
according to Berge (2001), a consolidation strategy and in some areas a reversal of the 
liberalization that characterized the act of 1985.  It was in general agreement with the 
policies of NFF, of prioritizing existing farms. Thus, the Ministry of Fisheries limited 
entry by discontinuing the annual allocations. Furthermore, they increased the 
maximum allowable volume. Politics had changed between 1985 and 1991 and 
become more attuned to the politics of the NFF; thus, NFF supported the 
amendments. 
This White Paper resulted in amendments to the Aquaculture Act (Ot.prp no. 
74 (1988-89)) in April 1989. The proposal was more conservative with respect to 
smolt and other species, than the existing act. In addition, it defined bankruptcies as 
change in ownership and new license would be needed, as well as it introduced 
sanctions and penalties for illegal activities. It should be noted, however, that the 
problems of continually increasing production and evasion of volume restrictions 
were not mentioned explicitly. 
The Directorate of Fisheries supported this line of consolidation, as the 
Directorate wanted a more restrictive regime.  The majority of the Parliament agreed 
to the amendments, except Centre Party. They wanted to keep the compromise of the 
1985 Aquaculture Act and, together with the Conservative Party; opposed the 
amplified regulations of smolt and other species. The Conservative and the 
Progressive Parties favoured liberalization and wanted Finnmark and Northern-Troms 
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exempt from the license requirements.  Ideally, they wanted the license system 
removed and replaced by an approval system. The opposition and majority, the 
Labour Party and the Christian Democratic Party (Krf) wanted to tighten the 
regulation of smolt to counteract overproduction. Thus, industry-political regulations 
were back (Berge, 2001; Innst.O. no. 100).  
The Ministry of Consumer and Administration, the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Industry supported liberalization. The industry should not be hindered, 
through strict regulations, from a healthy development. A small-scale structure would 
make the industry dependent upon public services, e.g. research and infrastructure; 
restrictions to majority ownership and “owner-operates” would increase public 
expenditure. The public was not to be responsible for neither the competition nor the 
economy in aquaculture (Berge, 2001). They called for a liberal practice with respect 
to ownership, size and allocation.  
The banks were included in the hearings because of the financial crisis in the 
industry – they had become active actors. In situations of bankruptcies, the banks 
feared a smaller possibility to utilize the collateral financially - regulations limited the 
number of interested buyers. They also feared that the Ministry of Fisheries would 
seize licenses to reduce production capacity. A liberalization of the ownership 
structure was in the interest of the banks. The Bank of Regional Development 
responded as a finance institution and supported the amendments, but wanted a 
flexible practice (Berge, 2001). 
It had become clear, there was a need to protect aquaculture farms 
from trafficking and fishing. Ot.prp 74 (1988-89) limited fishing and 
trafficking in the vicinity of farms to 100 and 20 meters, respectively. The 
Saltwater Fishing Act (3rd of June 1983, §28) had a similar restriction, but 
it only applied to fisheries in the ocean with the exception of salmon, trout 
and char. The Act regulating Salmon and Inland Fishing (6th of March 
1964) contained no regulation of fishing or trafficking. Thus, the salmon 
in the ocean was not protected and the Ministry of Fisheries included such 
protection in the Aquaculture Act (Law of 16th of June 1989, no. 58). 
The Directorate of Fisheries supported the Ministry’s argument. These acts did 
not secure safety zones for aquaculture farms. Moreover, regulations of trafficking 
were possibly applicable only to fishing vessels and not for recreational boats or 
ferries (Ot.prp. no74 (1988-98)).  
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It should be noted that, as late as 1989, the majority was in favour of a 
consolidation of the 1980s regulatory regime (Berge, 2001 and Innst. O. no. 100). The 
suggested amendments went through parliament in June 1989. 
 
A Second Step Toward Liberalization 
The Conservative Party got into government in 1989 and the Minister of 
Fisheries, Munkejord, started to work towards a liberalization of the Aquaculture Act.  
Norsk Hydro accused the authorities for being responsible for the unfortunate 
situation in the aquaculture industry. They wanted a radical change in the Aquaculture 
Act and a removal of the sales monopoly and the FOS. They blamed the authorities 
for the low degree of processing, the overproduction crisis and the dumping 
accusations. 
A hearing regarding industry-political exemptions of Northern-Troms and 
Finnmark was sent out in March 1990. The King could, through regulations, decide 
which activities would be exempt from ownership regulations. This was only a 
formalizing of the exemptions that had been used in the extra ordinary allocations for 
Northern-Troms and Finnmark in 1989. The Odelsting Proposition was almost 
finished and ready for further processing in Government and Parliament, but never 
made it that far.  
The process was stopped because the conservative administration in the 
Ministry of Fisheries took an initiative to liberalize ownership regulations. Munkejord 
argued, with the drop in prices and increased problems of disease and capital-drain, 
there was a danger of reduced health and environmental standards, as well as product 
quality. Thus, there was a need for capital form the outside and Northern-Troms and 
Finnmark were exempt from regulations of industry-policies and majority ownership. 
However, the Ministry could in special circumstances limit the number of licenses 
held by one owner - to limit the concentration of licenses. Thus, the problem of 
concentration of ownership was turned upside down. Previously, the Ministry could 
allow for majority ownership in more than one farm in special situations. Now, the 
Ministry could only limit majority ownership in special circumstances. Ownership 
interests should, as far as possible, have local ties.  This new proposal was a 
compromise to the right of the one in 1985 (Berge, 2001).  
Although the Conservative Party produced the amendments, it was a Labour 
Party government that would present the amendments in March 1991. The only 
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difference was the exclusion of the exemptions for Northern-Troms and Finnmark the 
grounds of production control and the EU. Otherwise, it was identical to that of the 
Conservative Party, even the arguments used were identical. 
The Union (Fellesforbundet, LO) became an active actor in this period. As an 
increased number of aquaculture workers were being unionized, there was a call for 
regulated working conditions through tariff agreements. The workers’ unions greatly 
influenced the Labour Party and wanted, initially, to liberalize and remove the 
Aquaculture Act. External capital and large firms would secure employment and 
improve working environments. Still, they agreed to keep the Aquaculture Act and 
supported the Ministry of Fisheries’ proposal to liberalize ownership, but felt that the 
Ministry could have further liberalized. 
The NFF was negative to liberalization of local ownership and opposed 
amendments that could increase external ownership. They supported the allowance of 
majority interests in more than one farm, but emphasized that a structure with the 
owner as the operator would guarantee an operation in harmony with the 
environment. An expansion in Norwegian aquaculture was accepted, but from within 
the industry and with a basis in local management. They also claimed, the existing 
law would control the industry with respect to the EEA and EU (Berge, 2001).  
Norsk Hydro repeated the arguments from the winter of 1990, as they 
delivered a response to the hearing, without being invited. Norsk Hydro agreed 
removing the requirement of local ownership for majority interests and for allowing 
majority interests in more than one farm.  
The Regional Development Bank had changed its point of view from the 
earlier hearings. It was also affected by the financial crisis and advised to the 
amendments. They went further, and wanted to remove the term: “owner interests 
should, as far as possible, have local ties”, because of problems with refinancing. It 
did not matter where the capital came from as long as production and employment 
were in the regions.  
The Norwegian Bank Union agreed to the suggested amendments to ownership. In 
addition, they wanted to increase public control of product quality, disease and 
contamination (Berge, 2001). 
The Directorate of Fisheries opposed deregulation of the Act and defended the 
existing act.  
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The term “sustainable development” was included for the first time (objectives 
paragraph - §1). This illustrates the increased environmental focus by authorities 
(FiDir, 2002). Similarly, the annual report of the NFF and FOS were concerned with 
fish-health and environment. Another addition was, due to the inability to control 
production, a quota upon fodder. The motive was entirely based upon health and 
environment. Thus, it was easier to get political accept for production regulations 
based upon environmental arguments, than industry-political arguments. 
Environmental considerations dominated over industry-political considerations 
(Berge, 2001). 
The Ministry of Fisheries used environmental arguments to liberalize 
ownership. They claimed, serious environmental work needed economically strong 
units; thus, there was a need for increased influx of capital.  
The Ministry of Environment agreed that the industry needed an improved 
financial base. However, they doubted the arguments used to remove requirements to 
local ties. On the one side, increased units could increase competence of environment 
and health. On the other side, distance between owner and operator could reduce 
environmental concerns (Berge, 2001). 
No changes were made to the proposal and it was presented for the Parliament 
in Odelsting Proposition no. 55 (1990-91). There was a wide agreement to allow 
majority interests in more than one farm. Regarding local ties, The Conservative 
Party, The Labour Party and the Progressive Party supported the removal of it. The 
Centre Party, Krf and the Socialist Party opposed its removal. This amendment was a 
marked change with respect to ownership; however, it was not a total deregulation. 
 
LENKA: Locality as a Scarce Resource 
The position of environmental interests was reinforced. In a paper to the 
Country Governor (T-3/86), the Ministry of Environment opened up for restricting the 
size of farms in accordance with the Pollution Control Act. A double set of production 
regulations arose - one based on environmental argumentation and the other based on 
industry-political arguments (production). While the fisheries administration 
liberalized the size regulations, the Ministry of Environment intervened. In 1990, the 
County Governor in Hordaland rejected an application for an emission permit related 
to volume expansion in Austevoll. The County Governor also introduced its own 
limits in tons. Similar incidences were reported in Sogn and Fjordane. Thus, several 
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actors criticized the increase in control by the Ministry of Environment and accused 
the Ministry of arrogance (Berge, 2001:267 (Norsk Fiskeoppdrett no. 2. 1989 and 
Norsk Fiskeoppdrett no. 10 1990)).  
Through the Plan and Building Act (PBL) and its coastal zone plans, a new 
area of activity in aquaculture arose in the Municipalities. Municipalities had 
previously commented on hearings. However, there were no ”normal” allocation 
rounds between 1985 and 1991; the foundations of municipal influence disappeared. 
With the new PBL, the municipalities’ responsibility changed form being industry-
political, to area-political (Berge, 2001). In the wake of a new Plan and Building Act a 
new project was initiated, the LENKA project. 
Growth in the aquaculture industry lead to increased pressure on sensitive and 
sometimes stressed area, and increased competition for coastal space (Ibrekk et al, 
1993). The government’s aim became finding optimal management of the coastal 
zone; to ensure economic and social benefits for the populations. In 1987 the Ministry 
of Environment, The Ministry of Small Government, the Ministry of Environment 
and the Ministry of Agriculture initiated the LENKA project. LENKA was a 
nationwide assessment of the suitability of the Norwegian coasts and watercourses for 
aquaculture and was a response to increased pressure on both coastal administration 
and environment. The goal was to develop a planning device for industry 
development by reviewing interests, infrastructure and environmental conditions; as 
well as, simplifying procedures and increasing involvement of local governments. 
LENKA would also provide central governments with an overview of the total 
capacity for coastal aquaculture in order to design a strategy (NOU 1990: 22). 
Guidelines and principles for classifying and selecting rivers and marine areas 
for aquaculture were developed. As a part of the LENKA-methodology, a model for 
calculating total area available for production of farmed fish (The Capacity-Model) 
was developed. The total coastal area was divided into 320 zones, which were 
evaluated on basis of area and recipient capacity, as well as other user interests and 
infrastructure. The zones were separated into different recipient groups, called A-, B- 
and C-zones, based on water exchange and ability to tolerate organic stress. An A-
zone had the best water exchange and C-zones had limited water exchange. Recipient 
capacity and area capacity for each zone was calculated, which expresses the total 
available capacity for fish farming (NOU 1990:22). Due to limitation upon fishing 
and trafficking (100 m and 20 m, respectively), the actual area used by aquaculture 
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was found to be greater than the physical area occupied by the net pen only (Ibrekk et 
al, 1993).  
LENKA analysed the total farming potential of the coast in the pretext of 
future utilizations and defined the coastal zone resources as under-utilized and under -
developed, especially in A-zones. An increase of about 600 000 tons without 
detrimental effects to the environment was estimated (NOU 1990:22).  
Ibrekk et al (1993) states that the pressure upon the costal zone may change as 
a result of changing requirements, such as: distance between farms, increased 
exploitation of coastal zone by activities that cannot coexist with aquaculture, new 
farmed species may compete with traditional aquaculture, and development of new 
technology may allow for exploitation of areas that are not presently used.  
In the early to mid 1980s, there was a shift from management of the 
Norwegian salmon farming industry per se, to a total management of the coastal area 
(Aarset, 1998). LENKA introduced a shift in management focus from farmer to 
farming site and recognized the fact that locality could become a scarce resource that 
needed to be managed (Berge, 2001). It should be noted, few institutions are using 
LENKA for localizing fish farms today. Some municipalities and counties use part of 
the LENKA method, but very few uses the entire method (Gulowsen et al., 1991).  
 
Environmental and Conservation Interests and Spatial Impacts 
In 1988, the alga Chrysochromulina polylepsis arrived at the Norwegian coast 
and a number of farms were moved into the fjords to avoid this lethal alga (Ot.prp. no. 
79 (1987-88)). Thus, to minimize the economic losses other considerations, usually 
hindering such movement, became secondary. As a result, farms intruded upon other 
users in the coastal zone. This alga, therefore, caused an increase in space utilized by 
fish farms for a short period of time and possibly increased conflicts.  
Wild salmon migrating to and from the rivers may be exposed to farmed 
organisms and there is a risk for contamination from the farmed fish. This risk is 
assumed to increase as closer to the river a farm is located.  
The LENKA project established temporary safety zones for anadrome salmon 
species in some of the most important salmon rivers (LD, 1993). The zones included 
fjord and coastal zones, as well as all watersheds emptying into these zones. The aim 
was to hinder genetic pollution and the spreading of Gyrodactylus salaris (LD, 1989).  
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Thus in 1989, the Ministry of Fisheries established 52 temporary safety zones 
for salmonids outside 125 salmon rivers. The purpose was to conserve vital salmon 
populations as biological and genetic foundation for continued growth and 
development in aquaculture, and to preserve the wild salmon stocks.  
 
 
Figure 5: Temporary safety zones for salmonids make up 6,7% of the sea area within the baseline 
(White Paper no. 43 (1998-99)).  
 
It is not permitted to establish new fish farms within the safety zones; existing 
farms were allowed to continue operating.  
The system of temporary safety zones was originally intended to last for five years. 
Thus, in 1994 an evaluation committee was set up. The committee advised in 1996 to 
prolong the safety zones, with some adjustments. In addition, they advised to establish 
buffer zones outside a number of the safety zones where new and existing farms 
would be subject to stricter regulations (White paper no 43 (1998-1999)). 
 
Increased use of Space – Veterinary Guidelines in 1989 
Due to increased energy content of fodder, farmers were able to grow more 
fish within the same volume. In addition, the size of the farms rose. As a result, health 
and environmental problems were amplified on the localities and the use of antibiotics 
soared.  
The Fish Disease Act shall prevent fish diseases in both domesticated and wild 
fish and its objective is to “prevent, limit and exterminate diseases in aquatic 
organisms” (Fish Disease Act no. 54, 13th of June 1997, (Ot.prp 52 (1996-97))). Most 
of the regulations accompanying the act were implemented in the period 1990 to 
1992, when there were large problems with disease such as furunculous and ILA. 
The Ministry of Agriculture delegated, in May 1987, the authority to approve 
and set requirements for fish farms to the county veterinaries. The first set of 
guidelines was produced in 1989 to prevent disease and point-pollution, as well as to 
ensure uniform processing of applications across the country. Since 1985, the practice 
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has been a minimum distance between farms of 1 000 m, which was stated in the 
guidelines (LD, 1989).  
However, during the outbreak of furunculous in Northern-Trøndelag in the 
mid-1980s, a distance of 1 000 m between farms was not enough to prevent water-
carried contamination. Thus, county veterinaries are free to demand larger distances 
when necessary. Local conditions such as currents, topography, geography, and 
density of fish farms and migration routes of wild fish are evaluated in each individual 
case (LD, 1989). 
 
The Practice of Minimum Distance in Different Counties 
The minimum requirements to distance vary between the different county 
veterinaries. It is difficult to give the exact minimum distance used, as the distance is 
based on judgment related to the local conditions and the actual risk for spreading 
disease. Thus, it is common to enforce distance requirements to exceed the minimum 
requirement (Fid, 2002).   
The veterinary of Hordaland and Sogn and Fjordane try to achieve a minimum 
distance of one to two km between localities for salmon. The distance between 
localities is increased with increased number of licenses on each locality (size); 
however, there is usually a ceiling of 36 000 cubic meters, or three licenses per 
locality. 
In Trøndelag, localities with different generations have a minimum 
requirement of three km, if the licenses belong to the same owner, and five km if the 
licenses have different owners. They do not take the size of the locality into 
consideration.  
The county veterinary for Finnmark and Troms use a minimum distance of one to two 
km between localities of same generation. There is a requirement of three to five km 
between localities of different generations and even stricter requirements to large 
localities approved for large-scale production.  
All of the county veterinaries emphasised more stringent requirements to 
distance on localities and to activities with an increased potential to spread 
contamination over large distances (Fid, 2002). 
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FOS Bankruptcy and Changing Organization of Sales 
Price-volume mechanisms led, by the mid 1980s, to a situation where the fish 
farmer produced at a loss. Moreover, the Fish Farmers’ Sales Organization (FOS) 
folded in 1991. Consequently, the Raw Fish Act was removed and the right to sell 
was returned to the farmers. Additionally, the removal of the ownership regulations in 
1991 resulted in a major reorganization of the industry, with an increase in large 
companies’ dominance at all levels. Thus, by 1995, licenses held by companies with 
more than one licence were between 70 and 90% in each county (Aarset, 1998:188). 
Therefore, this reduced the government’s responsibility, which induced a major 
redistribution of the access rights to the coastal zone, where the local residents were 
the losers and external investors were the winners (Aarset,1998).  
 
The Spatial Outcome of Legislation Amendments and Area Conservation 
Conservative industrial interests were attaining an audience. These actors and 
their discourses were therefore able to influence the legislative and discursive 
framework in the period. However, other arguments were also gaining strength, 
namely health and pollution discourses.  
The profile of the industry was characterized by being decentralized though 
the 1980s. However, the amendments to the Act in 1991, coupled with the bankruptcy 
of the FOS the same year, changed the structure of the industry and the dominance of 
larger companies increased at all levels. Thus, investors from outside the communities 
entered aquaculture. As a result, actions that previously had been accepted by the 
local community were no longer accepted – including the occupation of sea space.   
Advances in technology allowed farms to be located farther outwards in 
rougher water with better recipient and water exchange. Hence, aquaculture was 
moved out of areas with conflicts. In theory, there should have been a reduction in 
conflicts with respect to space; however, the number of licenses allocated from 1985 
to 1989 increased by 180 – almost half allocated to Northern-Norway. To further 
increase the use of space, the size of the farms increased from 8 000 m3 to 12 000 m3 
in 1989. An additional, not so obvious, increase in spatial use took place as the 
method of measuring fish farms changed. To protect the farms from trafficking and 
fishing a limit on 20 and 100 meters respectively was introduced in 1989 and inflicted 
a reduced freedom of movement and fishing for the general public. LENKA was 
established to evaluate the spatial use in aquaculture. Although this project never 
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became widely adopted, it did introduce safety zones and reveal space as an 
increasingly scarce resource in some areas.  As a result of the changes described in 
this chapter, there was an increased pressure upon area available for aquaculture and 
other uses and the levels of conflict rose.  
Industrial narratives positioned themselves in the aquaculture discussion, as 
size increased and ownership was deregulated. However, due to the appearance of 
environmental and health concerns in the mid-1980s, these discourses ensured that the 
industry discourse never became as influential as the regional development discourse. 


























Chapter 7: The Era of Health Interests (1992 to 2003) 
After the decline in production 1991-92, the production continued to rise from 
1993. In the worst year 1992, the total production of Atlantic salmon was 141 000 
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Figure 6: Production of Atlantic Salmon 1991-2002 in tons (FHL, 2003). 
 
Although the industry in the 1990s was characterized by trade obstruction, this 
era experienced an exceptional production growth. This growth was within the same 
production volume of 12 000 m3. The production increase was because of better 
vaccines and localities (Berge, 2001 (Fiskaren 19th of August, 1997)). In addition, 
technological development allowed for localizing farms in more exposed areas with 
better recipient (Berge, 2001 (Berge and Bjarnar, 1998:110)).  
Prizes stabilized in the period 1991 to 1994. In 1995, however, the prices 
dropped drastically and the profitability of fish farming declined (Berge, 2001:348).  
The shift in regulation regime led Norwegian fish farming into an integration process, 
both horizontally and vertically. Increased concentration of ownership was a fact. The 
ten largest companies were responsible for 7% of the total production in 1990. By 
1997, however, the ten largest companies were responsible for 35% of the total 
production (Berge, 2001:348). Ten years ago, the industry was characterized by 
homogeneity, mostly consisting of small companies. Today the industry has become 
heterogeneous, consisting of both small and large companies. By January 1998, 120 
autonomous one-license companies were still operating (Berge, 2001:349). Few 
companies are integrated “all the way to the market” and the degree of processing is 
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small. The spot-market dominates in all categories of fish farming; about 80% of the 
production was in 1998 sold in the spot-market (Berge, 2001:351 (Borch et al, 
1998:71)). 
The aquaculture business went through structural changes in the 1990s. 
Central historical characteristics have survived and adapted to the new structure.  
Since the freezing of overproduction and the FOS bankruptcy in the beginning of the 
1990s, Norwegian aquaculture legislation has been subjected to the political processes 
in the EU. Thus, since 1995, the continuous threat of anti-dumping measures has 
forced Norway to regulate production. These over-national considerations have lead 
to an industry that is more production regulated than ever before.  
 
Combating Disease: Generation Separation and Alternative Localities 
The first set of guidelines was produced in 1989 (as outlined in the previous 
chapter). Another set of guidelines, to supplement those of 1989, was produced in 
1993. Although this was a guideline for marine species, it was also used for salmonid 
species (Karlsen, 2003). It included requirements to distance between farms, as well 
as periodical abandonment of localities. The minimum distance is, however, only a 
guideline and available knowledge regarding the nature of contamination and locality 
conditions must also be considered in each individual application.  
A minimum distance of 5 km has been recommended with respect to diseases 
such as ILA (LD, 1993:18). Smaller distances between localities may be approved in 
areas with exceptional conditions. However, this requires that all farms must be a 
“unit of contamination”; that is, have identical year-classes in order to synchronize 
abandonment of localities. Consequently, due to the increased concentration of farms 
in an area, there is a need for increased distance between the different “units of 
contamination”. Therefore, approved and coordinated plans for operations, including 
separation of generations and periods of abandonment, are necessary.  
Generation separation and periods of abandonment to disinfect localities are 
important tools to prevent build-up of contamination in farms and localities. These 
regulations (1989 and 1993) have been preventive in fighting diseases. Norway has 
constructed a well-developed system for disease control and has significantly reduced 
damage from the most serious diseases - though problems are not solved. As a result, 
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Figure 7: Use of antibiotics per kg salmon and trout produced, relative to total production of 
salmon and trout (Norsk Medisinaldepot AS). 
 
An outline for a regulation for abandonment was produced, but was never sent 
on a hearing. Still, the outline is presently used as a guide for abandonment. This 
regulation tries to achieve an abandonment of 6 months, or a minimum of 2 months, 
every 36 months. On the vest coast, where salmon grows fast and farmers are able to 
slaughter 1 to 1.5 years after releasing the smolt, each license needs two locations. 
Farther north, where salmon does not grow as fast and is slaughtered 1.5 to 2 years 
after release, three locations are needed (Karlsen, 2003). Areas where farms are 
situated closer than the recommended minimum should coordinate a joint 
abandonment, in accordance with plans approved by the County Veterinary. At the 
present permanent guidelines are being produced by the Norwegian Animal Health 
Authority (Pål Erik Jensen, 12th of May 2003). 
Veterinary distance requirements are presently the primary factor guiding the 
situating of fish farms. The aquaculture industry sees these requirements as a primary 
limiting factor. Some actors claim that it would be a catastrophe if the present 
distance requirement should be applied to established farms. County veterinaries 
believe it is easy to locate established actors, but it may be difficult to locate new 
actors.  
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Further, the county veterinaries claim distance requirements do not only 
reduce the risk of contamination, but also increase the possibilities of expansion 
within the established localities. Thus, they want to avoid licenses in the “buffer 
zones” between different localities and generations (Fid, 2002).  
Aquaculture organizations and parts of the management, including the county 
veterinaries, believe that the situation of area will worsen, unless alternative methods 
for operation and/or vaccines are developed (Fid, 2002).  
 
National Salmon Watercourses and Fjords 
A Royal Decree appointed the Wild Salmon Commission in 1997 to «review 
the overall situation of the wild salmon stocks and propose management strategies and 
action programmes. Issues associated with the regulation of fishing, watercourse 
management and salmon farming would be given particular attention.» (NOU 1999 
9:18). The background for the Committee's work was the sharp decline in wild 
salmon stocks in recent years. Escaped farm fish together with salmon lice were 
regarded as the biggest environmental problem of fish farming. In addition, 
Gyrodactylus salaris had affected several of the country's most important salmon 
stocks. The Committee concluded that the situation for salmon in Norway was serious 
and in some areas the crisis was acute  (NOU 1999:9). This situation called for the 
establishment of special protected areas for wild salmon. The Committee proposed 
increased protection for a number of the most important salmon watercourses and 
migratory areas in fjords and along the coast.  
In sea, protection was directed at salmon farming operations and their 
intervention in estuaries. A system of national salmon watercourses and national 
salmon fjords could protect and strengthen the largest and healthiest salmon stocks. In 
essence, this entailed a prohibition on further intervention and watercourse regulation 
in the national salmon watercourses and a ban on salmon farming in national salmon 
fjords.  
The Committee proposed 50 specific watercourses and nine fjords or coastal 
stretches to be incorporated in the scheme. Outside national salmon watercourses, 
where national salmon fjords would not be established, the Committee recommended 
protection and action zones. The Committee proposed to abolish temporary safety 
zones outside watercourses not proposed as national salmon watercourses (NOU 
1999:9).  
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Based on NOU 1999:9, the Ministry of Environment proposed a White Paper 
(no. 79 (2001-2002)) to establish a system of National Salmon Watercourses and 
Fjords. The White Paper presented proposals that collectively would give a more 
comprehensive management and secure the restocking of the salmon populations, 
similar to the NOU 1999:9.  
New activities in the national salmon watercourses that could damage the wild 
salmon populations would not be allowed. The salmon fjords were about the same 
size as the temporary safety zones (1989) and were to have two management regimes: 
zones of prohibition and zones of restriction. Fish farming would not be permitted in 
zones of prohibition and existing farming activities were to move out of the zone 
within five years. New farms were not to establish in the zones of restriction and 
existing farms would be subjected to stricter regulations. Ten of the national salmon 
fjords were suggested as zones of prohibition. Five commercial farms and four 
research farms would be affected. National Salmon Watercourses and Fjords were to 
be permanent, but new knowledge and technology may lead to adjustments. 
The difference compared to NOU 1999:9 was that the national salmon fjords 
and watercourses were to be implemented in two rounds. White paper. no. 79 
suggested establishing 37 national salmon watercourses and 21 national salmon fjords 
in round one and 12 watercourses and four fjords in round two. The proposal was sent 
on a wide hearing in the summer of 2001.  
There was a general support of the commission’s suggestions. Still, the 
proposal was contested. The Directorate of Nature Management (DN) was critical to 
the proposal and thought it was a clear weakening relative to the Wild Salmon 
Commission’s suggestions and the temporary safety zones. Thus, national salmon 
fjords had to be closed to all salmon farming.  
The Directorate of Fisheries supported the introduction of salmon fjords as a 
substitute for the existing temporary safety zones. Similarly, the Norwegian Animal 
Health Authority supported the main principle of National Salmon Watercourses and 
Fjords, but questioned whether the proposal would give the wild salmon a better 
protection than the temporary safety zones. It should not be opened for additional fish 
farms of marine species inside the prohibition zone, they claimed. 
The majority of the County Governors were critical to the proposal and to the 
abolishing of temporary safety zones. They claimed the situation for the wild salmon 
would be worsened, as the proposal was not enough to increase protection in 
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migrating areas in the fjords. The municipalities could be divided into two groups: 
those with aquaculture interests and those with interests in the wild salmon. The first 
group opposed the proposal and the second group supported the proposal.  
NFF was critical to the proposal and felt there were efforts fighting the fish 
farming industry. Area restrictions to protect wild salmon would have, due to the 
pattern of migration, limited effects. It was seen as unreasonable that an important 
industry, such as aquaculture, would be limited without evaluating consequences. The 
scientific basis for the proposal was deficient and they opposed making the system 
permanent.  
For the Norwegian Salmon Rivers’ Association the proposal weakened the 
protection of Norwegian wild salmon populations. National salmon fjords had to be 
free of all farming of salmonids and temporary safety zones had to be kept. The 
Norwegian Association of Hunters and Anglers (NJFF) and Norwegian Society for 
the Conservation of Nature (NNV) were of similar opinions (White Paper no. 79 
(2001-2002)).  
 
The Spatial Effects of Health Regulations and Area Conservation 
The aquaculture industry today is characterized by biological production with a strong 
industrial element, where the majority of salmon and rainbow trout producers take a 
part in vertically integrated structures. Actors are becoming increasingly differentiated 
(Sandbæk, 2003).  
During the 1990s, market considerations and industry-policy were toned 
down; still, due to the markets in the EU, the industry has never been more strictly 
regulated. These market considerations have led to several production regulations, 
such as volume, density and feed quotas.  
Veterinary regulations dealing with distance between farms were introduced in 
1989 and greatly increased the spatial use in aquaculture. In 1993, spatial use was 
further increased, as regulations of periodical abandonment were introduced. The 
result was an increased need for alternative localities. Thus, in the north of Norway 
the total area requirement per license was increased by a three-fold, whereas on the 
west coast the area requirement doubled.  
Environmental considerations, such as temporary safety zones and National 
Salmon Watercourses and Fjords, affected aquaculture by not permitting fish farm in 
particular areas. Although these safety zones do not constitute a large percentage of 
 60
the total area within the baseline, the zones may include areas suitable for 
aquaculture. 
The momentum of the industrial discourse was effectively stopped by 
environment and health arguments. These discourses led to increased use of space, as 
well as reduced the space available for aquaculture. In the end, the pressure upon 





























Chapter 8: Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) 
The coastal ecosystem is productive and has valuable habitats. It is also the 
home of a growing number of people, a source of food, a communication link and a 
recreational area. The human use of the coastal zone leads to pollution problems and 
conflicts between users (Ministry of Environment, T-1389, 2002). According to 
O’Hagen and Cooper (2001), it is the variable conditions and functions that make 
coastal zone management difficult. Similarly, heterogeneity in the coastal zone makes 
collective action more difficult to organize. The conflicts of interests are many, the 
bargaining power is unequally distributed, some have more at stake than others and 
there are usually incompatible values among 
user groups (Jentoft, 2000). 
The coastal zone has been an open 
commons, but in the last 50 years the 
commons have closed because of fishing 
quotas and aquaculture licenses. Thus, there 
has been an increase in special uses in the 
coastal zone. Moreover, aquaculture activities 
exclude other uses and its area demand has 
increased, because of increased maximum 
allowable volume, introduction of safety zones and stricter veterinary regulations. 
Expansions in the aquaculture industry led to conflicts and have been a reason for 
initiating coastal zone planning (Sandersen, 1996).  Thus, suitable areas for 
aquaculture are becoming increasingly scarce in a number of municipalities 
(Sandersen, 1996). The future level of conflict will depend on how well coastal 
municipalities, administrations and industry are able to co-operate.  To minimize 
conflicts in the coastal zone, an overview of available area for aquaculture is essential.  
Therefore, we need an integrated and flexible system to deal with these 
problems, e.g. Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM). ICZM addresses 
problems of managing conflicts among different users and uses in the coastal zone.  
 
Coastal Zone Management in Norway 
The Norwegian coastline is 57 000 km long and 80% of the Norwegian populations 





environment. Only a few limited fjord areas and major harbours have experienced 
pollution. Coastal areas play an important role in settlement, employment and the 
economy. Various economic activities take place here, such as: fisheries, aquaculture, 
transport, oil processing, service industry, tourism and recreation (Sandersen, 1996; 
www.kystsone.no). In addition, there are various agencies of government and research 
at different levels with differing interests, responsibilities and ambitions in the coastal 
zone (Jentoft, 2000). 
Norway has an efficient system for coastal governance, including a good legal 
and institutional framework. The system is based on principles of ICZM promoting a 
holistic, collaborative, participatory and bottom-up approach (Fid, 2002).  
Coastal zone planning (CZP) is defined in Sandbæk (2003) as planning that 
unites sea areas and land areas along the coast. If a municipality produces a plan that 
includes the area in the sea, we could call this a coastal zone plan. Coastal zone plans 
are voluntary and the legal mandate is the Planning and Building Act (1985), which 
co-ordinates and facilitates decentralised planning.  
Municipalities make legally binding decisions, within national and regional 
frameworks, to secure a sustainable development of coastal resources for the benefit 
of the coastal communities and the entire nation. Different parts of Norway have 
different needs for coastal zone management. A total of 280 coastal municipalities, 16 
counties and various ministries and interests groups are involved in the coastal zone 
(Sandersen, 1996:2).  
A coastal zone plan contains: objectives, long-term goals and programmes for 
sustainable development in the coastal zone. It also includes action for nature 
conservation and management, as well as pollution abatement (Ministry of 
Environment, 2002). Of 65 municipalities with more than four aquaculture licenses, 
52 (80%) used coastal planning (Sandbæk, 2003:22). In the south, environmental and 
recreational interests have a large influence; thus, coastal zone plans are more 
defensive, conserving and restricting the use of area. In the north, the focus is on 
industry interests and employment and there is less pressure upon area. Thus, coastal 
zone plans are offensive and lay the premises for aquaculture. The motives for coastal 
zone management depend upon the structure of settlement, the pressure on area and 
the structure of the industry, but a typical aquaculture municipality use coastal zone 
plans more often than a fisheries municipality (Sandersen, 1996). 
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Conflicts of Space in Aquaculture 
Conflicts of area arise when two or more area-uses compete for the same area 
and co-use is not possible (Sandbæk, 2003). Although area has not been a major 
limiting factor for Norwegian aquaculture in the past, area is becoming scarcer. The 
lack of localities is a result of the rapid growth in number of licenses, accompanied 
with stricter veterinary regulations. Aquaculture is in conflict with a great variety of 
area interests, but conflicts are generally fewer in the north (Fid, 2002).  
Motivations for rejecting applications have changed in the past. Rejections due 
to wild-salmon interests and pollution have been reduced, partly because 
technological developments allow the use of more exposed localities. Veterinary 
requirements have become the most important limiting factor, due to requirement to 
distance between localities and periodic abandonment of localities. Rejections due to 
fisheries and traffic interests have also risen. Presently the main motivations for 
rejecting applications are based on veterinary arguments, fisheries interests and nature 






































































































Figure 8: Reasons for rejections of aquaculture applications  (FiD, 2002). 
 
The majority of the actors in the costal zone consider coastal zone plans to be 
a good instrument to resolve conflicts. Thus, there are great expectations to the 
ongoing revision of the Plan and Building Act.  
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Conflicts of Space Within the Aquaculture Industry 
Problems of finding suitable and not conflicting locations for aquaculture is 
growing. Space has become relatively restricted on the south coast (Sørlandet), 
Rogaland, Hordaland and partly in Møre and Romsdal. The Directorate of Fisheries, 
as well as aquaculture organizations experience finding new localities as relatively 
difficult (Fid, 2002).  






Figure 9: Perceived difficulties in finding new localities for aquaculture (Fid, 2002). 
 
It is believed that finding localities for aquaculture will become more difficult in 
the future. The reasons are:  
a) Increasing numbers of applications for shell and marine specie farming.  
b) Increasingly stringent veterinary regulations related to distance.  
c) Conservation plans (marine conservation plans and national salmon fjords). 
There are, however, expectations that problem of area will be reduced if co-
localization and poly-cultures are allowed. It is also expected increased production on 
the best localities and a possible increase in the “artificial” size limit. Thus, there are 
enormous expectations to the upcoming allocation guide being prepared by the 
Norwegian Animal Health Authorities. 
 
Conflicts Between Aquaculture and Fisheries 
The traditional fishery is important, especially for the settlement in Northern 
Norway. Norway has a large coastal fishing fleet consisting of small vessels. A total 
of 13 700 fishers had capture fisheries as the main occupation in 2001. That same 
year, a total of 2.6 million tons marine fish (round weight) was landed, at a value of 
11.2 billion NOK (SSB2, 2002). The fishing areas for the coastal fleet is in the coastal 
zone and need protection from activities that may adversely affect the fisheries. 
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Conflicts between fisheries and aquaculture rise as fishers are hindered in 
using trawls and nets in specific areas and because farms are situated in spawning 
areas. Parts of Norway have also experienced concerns related to pollution, medicine 
use and genetic pollution. The level of conflict between captures fisheries and 
traditional aquaculture interests vary from medium to low.  








Figure 10: Degree of conflict between fisheries and aquaculture (Fid, 2002). 
 
Due to a good dialog between fisheries and aquaculture, disagreements are 
usually easily solved. Conflicts are greatest in municipalities with an active coastal 
fleet, lacking a good coastal zone plan and/or where aquaculture is relatively new.  
It is expected an increase in the level of conflict between capture fisheries and 
aquaculture in the future, especially due to the expected expansion in farming of shell 
and marine species. In case of conflicts, capture fisheries and established activities 
have usually been prioritized. Capture fisheries have taken place long before 
aquaculture and important localities for fisheries are less mobile than fish farms. The 
aquaculture industry believes future conflicts will depend upon veterinary restrictions 
and whether alternative models of localizing farms are developed (Fid, 2002). A 
factor that might contribute to a lower level of conflict may be the fact that for each 
year, fewer fishers and fewer vessels land the same amount of fish (Sandbæk, 2003). 
However, it should be noted that, according to Sandersen (1998), fishers are often 
passive in coastal zone planning, as they do not perceive it as a tool to solve the 
problems in the capture fisheries. 
 
Nature Conservation Areas 
The level of conflict between established conservation areas and aquaculture 
varies along the coast. However, the general level of conflict is moderate. The 
regional offices of the National Federation of Fish and Aquaculture Industries (FHL) 
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experience the level of conflict as relatively high.  County governors, however, 
perceive the level of conflict as limited, because of limited numbers of conserved 
areas in many counties and these are usually unsuitable for aquaculture. The conflict 
is highest during the decision making process.  
The level of conflict for planned nature conservation an area is experienced as 
relatively high, because the industry expect to be excluded from otherwise suitable 
areas.  Future level of conflict will depend on actors’ participation. The majority of 
the actors believe in an increase in level of conflict in the future, mainly due to the 
process of marine conservation plan and National Salmon Watercourses and Fjords.  
 
Wild Salmon Interests 
Because of escaped farmed salmon and salmon lice, the level of conflict 
between wild salmon interests and aquaculture is relatively high. Some county 
governors claim there are large “dark-numbers” related to escapes. Due to risk of 
genetic pollution, aquaculture applications may be rejected from otherwise suitable 
areas. The conflict level is further increased because of national salmon fjords and 
temporary safety zones. Fish farmers’ organizations and a large part of the 
management are critical to the use of area-conservation. Knowledge regarding the 
effects of area protection is poor and has rarely been evaluated. County governors, on 
the contrary, claim area-conservation is insufficient. An increase in conflicts in the 
next few years is expected, but will decline when national salmon fjords and marine 
conservation plans are implemented.  








Figure 11: Level of Conflict Between Wild Salmon Interests and Aquaculture (Fid, 2002). 
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Aquaculture and Traffic Interests 
The Coast Directorate sees the growing number of fish farms as a problem 
with respect to trafficking and rejects an increasing number of applications. The 
conflicts are mostly related to shell farming. A small increase in the future level of 
conflict is expected, because of the anticipated growth in aquaculture, new traffic 
routes for speedboats and a priority to protect recreational boat routes. 
 
Conflicts with Other Farmed Species (cod as an example) 
Salmon has dominated Norwegian fish farming, but is increasingly being 
accompanied by farming of marine species such as cod, halibut, turbot and wolffish. 
Price of cod increased to historical heights in the second half of the 1990s and was 
followed by a decline in price of salmon in 2001-2002. This gave rise to an increased 
optimism and increased research on cod farming. For cod to become as successful as 
salmon, problems with production and production cost of fry must be conquered. 
Moreover, there is an acute lack of suitable sites for salmon farming in parts of 
Norway; salmon already occupies the majority of the localities. Thus, if locality is a 
scarce resource, then priorities have to be made. Which specie gives the best marginal 
contribution? It is most likely that salmon will be most profitable for some time still. 
Thus, cod may lose in the initial phases to its established “big brother”, the salmon 
(Vassdal, 2002). One may therefore question whether localities for cod and other 
marine species will be available. Nordlys reported (23rd of March 2003) that two fish 
farmers in Northern Troms – an area that should have plenty of space - had problems 
of finding new localities (Enoksen, 2003).   
To illustrate potential conflicts in cod farming, lets look at an example from 
the Argyll Coast in Scotland. Cod farming is seen, by some actors, as the last chance 
to save the Scottish cod and to maintain an independent supply of cod.  
Salmon has been controversial because of pollution, threats to wild 
populations and chemical use. The cod, [the stakeholders] claim, does not have any of 
these problems. The stakeholders also claim cod farming will create 1 600 jobs and 
produce 25 000 tons of cod each year. As an additional advantage, farmed cod 
consume less food than its ocean-going relative. Thus, cod farming will allow the 
wild populations to recover.  
The Scottish Fishermen’s Federation does not believe in such “fairytales” and 
question the sustainability of this business. Because farmed cod feed on wild fish 
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from capture fisheries, cod farming will increase the pressure upon wild cod stocks. 
Recreational fishermen also oppose cod farming, as cod farms will be located close to 
one of the last Scottish rivers still receiving spawning salmon. They worry about the 
effects cod farms may have on wild salmon (Khan, The Observer, 6th of October 
2002). 
It is possible, according to the large smolt producers and the Ministry of 
Fisheries, the annual production 10-12 years from now will be close to the present 
production of salmon (400 000 tons). This is 100 000 tons more than what the cod 
fisheries in the North Sea landed in the peak year 1981. The FAO (Food and 
Agriculture Organization) said in 2000: “Cod farming has the potential to produce 
1.5-2.0 million tons in 2015”. Obviously the ambition regarding cod farming is high 
(Sandbæk, 2003:64). 
The challenge of the authorities is therefore to allocate areas to provide 
opportunities for cultivating a vide variety of species – even combining cultivation of 
several special in one locality (Gregussen, 2001).  
 
Military Areas and activities 
The military use coastal areas for training. There are about 60 marine training 
areas along the Norwegian coast (White paper no. 43 (NOU 1988:8)). Conflicts arise 
as aquaculture is completely banned from these areas. The level of conflict is 
especially high in Southern-Troms, where the military occupies large areas suitable 
for aquaculture. Most actors believe the level of conflict between the military and the 
aquaculture industry will keep constant or decline in the future, if aquaculture could 
enter some of the military training areas.  
 
Wild Game Interests 
At the present there is 335 000 hunters in the Norwegian hunting register 
(Sandbæk, 2003:78). Hunting is an essential part of the Norwegian peoples outdoors 
recreation. The increase in populations of seal and otter is problematic for the 
aquaculture industry. Otters cause escapes if they make holes in net pens; as well, 
Heron and Cormorants feed on smolt. County governors are concerned aquaculture 
will increase the pressure to hunt certain species and report of some illegal hunting. 




The level of conflict because of pollution is medium. Although the level of 
pollution is claimed to be low, there is a concern about increasing pollution. County 
governors claim that emissions in harbours and fjord areas are under control and the 
challenge is to clean up “old sins”. However, the uncertainty of diffused and 
transported environmental pollution, such as, dioxins, PCB, PAH and radioactive 
elements, is far greater. There are also concerns about emissions of processing waters 
from the petroleum industry and accidents with shipping of petroleum and radioactive 
waste along the Norwegian coast. Various actors believe the level of conflict will 
increase, because increased knowledge will increase the requirements related to 
environmental pollution.  
 
Outdoors and Recreation Interests 
Public access to boating, fishing, swimming and hiking is deeply rooted in 
Norwegian culture. Conflicts between outdoors and recreational interests and 
aquaculture are predominantly in the south and southeast of Norway, as well as 
Rogaland and Hordaland. According to the aquaculture industry, trafficking by 
recreational boats, recreational fishing, and areas for swimming limit aquaculture in 
some areas. The county governors evaluate conflicts in or close to important 
recreational areas as high and want fish farms distanced from recreational areas. A 
rise in level of conflict related to farming of salmon is not expected.  
 
Recreational (salmon) Fishing and “Fishing-Tourism” 
Recreational fishing is something the settled population carry out. Foreigners 
and tourists perform ”fishing-tourism”, usually executed by local operators. In 2001, a 
total of 225 000 tourists came to Norway to fish (Sandbæk, 2003:77). The Norwegian 
College of Fisheries estimated that fishing-tourism left about two billion NOK in 
Norwegian coastal communities annually (Fid, 2002:66).  The level of conflict is in 
general limited, but is significant in Rogaland and on the south coast (Sørlandet).  
Due to concerns about genetic pollution, county governors are especially 
restrictive when recommending farms in or near the mouths of salmon rivers. The 
practice has been that applications are rejected if the Directorate for Nature 
Management (DN) does not recommend it (Ørebech, 1988:70 (Ot.prp nr. 53 (1984-
85), s 9-10)). 
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According to aquaculture organizations, most conflicts have been because 
recreational fishing hinders the establishment of aquaculture. A number of county 
governors give a lower priority to aquaculture than recreational fisheries, as 
aquaculture may lower the quality of the wild fish. A moderate increase in the conflict 
level is expected.  
 
Esthetical and landscape interests 
The level of conflict with respect to aesthetics is in general moderate. There 
has been large improvement with regards to esthetical values. Aquaculture 
organizations state, conflict level is low in areas where aquaculture has been present 
for a long time. Some claim owners of recreational housing (tourists) complain far 
more often than people settled in these areas (Katranidid et al., 2003)3. The conflict 
level will stay constant or be reduced in the close future.  
 
Other Interests 
Large areas are needed when reindeer herds migrate between pastures every 
spring and fall. In the coastal zone, areas for swimming across sounds and pastures 
are important; hence, reindeers must not be excluded from these areas (Troms 
Fylkeskommune, 1999). Finnmark has in some instances included migration routes 
for domestic reindeer in coastal zone plans.   
The extraction of petroleum on the continental shelf is important to the 
Norwegian economy. Part of this industry’s activities takes place in the coastal zone - 
for instance, pipes and installations for landing oil and gas (White paper no. 43 (1998-
99)). Still, the petroleum activities are limited. 
The mineral industry includes mining of sand in the coastal zone and mining 
of shell sand in the ocean. Mining of shell sand is takes place in shallow waters, 
mainly in the counties of Agder, Rogaland and Hordaland (White paper no. 43 (1998-
99)). The level of conflict is presently low.  
The largest concentration of population in Norway is along the coast. The 
coastal zone is therefore exposed to a large pressure because of expansion of cities, 
villages, infrastructure and industry, especially oil refineries. In addition, the 
                                                          
3 Study by Katranidis et al. was done on two islands in Greece. It found that local people are in general 
more positive to aquaculture development than tourists, as it contribute to the local economy. This has 
also been noted in Norway. 
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Norwegian people enjoy outdoors recreation; we are a people of hunters and 
gatherers. Parts of the coast are particularly attractive for recreational housing. Thus, 
we own as many as 350 000 recreational cabins (Sandbæk, 2003:76). As the level 
household income increases so does the pressure to build more recreational housing, 
resulting in an increased pressure upon the coastal zone.  
 
Limitations and Weaknesses 
The Planning and Building Act (PBL) gave the municipalities the same 
planning possibilities in the sea as on land. As the coastal zone is under water, the sea 
floor is inaccessible, marine resources are mobile and there is a limited protection 
from terrestrial run-off. Thus, the role of the PBL is unclear, e.g. private property 
reaches to a depth of 2 m; water outside this limit is public property. Thus, what area 
is to include in the coastal zone is not clear and a complete autonomy is difficult to 
achieve. Further, it is questionable whether the geographic scope of coastal zone 
planning is adequate to solve problems transecting local and regional boundaries. The 
county council may be a more appropriate unit to solve such problems.  
Because of the large number of actors in the coastal zone, planning may create 
new and activate old conflicts. There may also be conflicts between the municipality 
acting as a representative for state, and acting as an independent local authority 
(Sandersen, 1996). Agencies guard their objectives and the responsibilities and 
recourses that accompany them. Survival of the agency depends upon maintaining the 
objectives and resources intact. Anything that threatens the objectives or the resource 
base tends to be protected with vigour and persistence (Jentoft, 2000 (Cincin-Sain and 
Knecht, 1998)). The coastal zone may become what Sandersen (1998) calls an 
“institutional battlefield”, where the winner so far has been the central government 
and sector interest, such as the fishing industry. The Losers have been the municipal 
and regional authorities that are concerned with their own coastal areas (Jentoft, 
2000).  
Further, it may be less “profitable” for local politicians to accept responsibility 
for increased management, as these responsibilities tend to cause conflicts and reduce 
popularity. Some municipalities may be too small to allow for political or 
bureaucratic decisions without partiality.  
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Sandersen (1996) identified four problematic areas in coastal zone management 
(CZM). 
1. CZM may increase requirements to administration and knowledge in the 
municipalities. It also poses a challenge for politicians’ knowledge.  
2. Municipal intervention in the coastal zone may lead to new or increased 
conflicts between sectors internally in the municipality. A new management 
system change power structures and new groups of actors will be activated.  
3. The existing PBL does not clearly specify the opportunities of 
environmental and industrial management of municipalities. 
4.  The expansion of the management system threatens the domain and 
competence between municipal and governmental sector authorities, and 
amongst governmental sector authorities.  
Municipal costal zone plans are tools supposed to reduce conflicts in the 
coastal zone. These plans are juridical binding and the plan processes are usually 
comprehensible and uncomplicated. The experience with coastal zone plans is 
greatest on the west coast, in Trøndelag and in parts of Nordland. In the last few years 
have the majority of coastal municipalities produced coastal zones plans, especially in 
connection to aquaculture - the number one motivational factor for producing coastal 
zone plans.  
The premises for a good plan is based upon a solid database, a high quality 
planning process, participation and periodic revision of plans. Also, there has to be a 
political will to make priorities and municipalities must respect approved plans and 
not give too many dispensations. Further, a condition for success seems to depend 
upon the way in which planning processes are organized and how actors are involved 
(Jentoft, 2002 (Bennet,96)).  
 
Powerful Actors in the Coastal Zone  
The “conflict-energy” between user groups in the limited coastal zone has 
increased in the recent past. Conflicting use of area in the coastal zone is in general 
between use and conservation. However, there are also conflicts between sector and 
territory interests, and jurisdiction of fish authorities and municipal governments 
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(Jentoft, 2000). Institutions, such as fisheries management, environmental 
management, aquaculture management, municipal administration and so forth, collide 
in the coastal zone and make communication between the different groups difficult 
(Sandbæk, 2003). 
 
Figure 12: An Illustration of Conflicts in the coastal zone (Sandbæk, 2003:42). 
 
The motivations for planning in the coastal zone varies, but there is a general 
desire for a holistic and co-ordinated use of space in the coastal zone to solve existing 
or expected conflicts with respect to area (Sandersen, 1996; 1998 (Vassdal, 1992; 
Bennet, 1996b)).  
The attitudes toward coastal zone management differ. How coastal zone 
planning is perceived depend on if the municipality has a tradition for planning. 
Further, according to Sandersen (1998) it also seem to matter who is responsible for 
coastal zone planning, whether it is the business (industry) or the environmental 
coordinator. Moreover, the presence of aquaculture also influences the attitudes 
towards coastal planning, as aquaculture is the source of conflict in many 
municipalities. Thus, municipalities with well-developed aquaculture industry tend to 
be more positive to coastal planning.  
A number of municipalities sees coastal zone planning as a way to realize their 
ambitions for a more extensive local management of marine recourses within the 
baseline. However, many municipalities have been disappointed when they 
understood how limited their freedom of action actually is within the framework of 
coastal zone planning (CZP). For other municipalities, the plans are seen as obstacles 
reducing political freedom of action and make local politics increasingly bureaucratic. 
Thus, CZP may be perceived as a narrowing of the freedom of action, rather than as 
an opportunity (Sandersen, 1996, 1998). 
Similarly, actors in the industry experience the CZP as rigid and limiting, 
relative to the previous flexible adjustment in the coastal commons. How much 
weight is put on the aquaculture industry varies between regions in Norway. 
 
Industry and Recreaton (use) Conservation 
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Municipalities on the northwest coast and Northern-Norway greatly emphasize 
industry development in their coastal plans. This may be because municipalities 
farther north have weaker economies and that activities such as outdoors and 
recreation is relatively less important (Sandersen, 1996, 1998 (Vassdal, 1992; Bennet, 
1996a, Jørgensen and Kjørsvik, 1996) 
Bureaucrats and planners believe coastal zone plans to be a relevant answer to 
the increasing pressure on area (Sandersen, 1996,1998)).  
Environmental considerations are the most important reason for coastal 
planning in the south of Norway, but become less important farther north. If we 
separate conflicts into two sectors: those due to resources and those due to localities, 
then there are indications that conflicts in Northern-Norway are due to resources 
(Sandersen, 1998 (Astrup, 1991)).  
CZM tries to incorporate all the different discourses, thus it encompasses a 
large number of discourses. Moreover, CZM activates various narratives and various 
actors. Hence, different actors, operating within different discursive framework and 
with different agendas influence coastal zone management. Thus, coastal zone 
planning becomes an arena for struggling discursive practices. What becomes a 
dominant discourse depends upon the setting the aquaculture industry operates within. 
Thus, coastal zone management is not a “neutral” or even a just process. The 
influences of actors, even within a municipality, tend to differ – bargaining power 
varies. The fisheries industry, for instance, tend to be passive in coastal zone planning 
processes; they do not perceive CZM as a device to solve their problems. Similarly, 
who is responsible for the planning process will also influence the management. If the 
environmental coordinator is in charge of CZP, then it should not be surprising if the 
plans focus on conservation. If the business co-ordinator, however, were in charge of 
the plan, then it would be likely that industry would be in focus. Moreover, the 
outcome of a CZP also depends upon where in Norway it takes place. A plan in the 
north of Norway tends to be more focused on industry than in the south, where it 
tends to be focused on conservation. Therefore, powerful actors in municipalities, 
industry or government drive the process of coastal management according to their 





Chapter 9: A Discourse Analysis Related to Space in Aquaculture 
The purpose of this thesis is not only to describe the discourses, but also to 
show how discourses operate in the public domain. Thus, this thesis will show how 
discourses play a role and act as a reference point when actors argue in the debate 
concerning allocation of space in aquaculture. The analysis will use the discourse 
theory outlined in chapter 3.  
Actors place themselves within a certain discourse, which they employ in 
discussions regarding aquaculture policies. The paper has identified five aquaculture 
policy discourses:  
1) The Regional-Policy discourse (RP). 
2) The Industrial-Policy discourse (IP). 
3) The Environmental-Policy discourse (EP). 
4) The Health-Policy discourse (HP). 
5) The Coastal Zone Management discourse (CZM). 
First of all, the RP-discourse emphasizes a policy based on a small-scale, “owner-
operates” and regionalized structure. Secondly, the IP-discourse focuses upon 
liberalization of legislation, economies of scale, international competition and 
industrial competence. Thirdly, the EP-discourse emphasises regulations based upon 
environmental concerns. This discourse contains environmental issues such as 
emissions, genetic pollution and biodiversity. The HP-discourse represents veterinary 
regulations with respect to animal and consumer health. Finally, a management that is 
holistic, participatory and flexible characterizes the CZM-discourse. In spatial terms 
the CZM-discourse sees aquaculture in relations to other uses in the coastal zone.  
 
The Formative Period and “Subordinate” Discourses 
The temporary Aquaculture Act of 1973 and the permanent Act of 1981, both 
had their origins in the Lysø-commission. The commission laid forth the premises for 
the future aquaculture development. The RP-discourse was hegemonic in the 1970s 
and emphasized regional development, small-scale structure and production 
adjustments related to market demand. The RP-discourse contained two subordinate 
discourses: the Fisheries discourse and the Agriculture discourse. The Fisheries 
discourse related aquaculture to fisheries. Fishers, fish farmers and a majority of 
politicians supported this discourse. Two influential actors were the Ministry of 
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Fisheries and the Directorate of Fisheries. Most of the amendments in 1981 were 
taken from the feedback of the Directorate of Fisheries, whose frame of reference was 
the “Coastal-Model” (described in chapter 4).  
The Agriculture discourse saw aquaculture as a side-occupation to agriculture 
and was supported by farmers and agricultural interests. This discourse, however, lost 
ground as the Aquaculture Act, hence aquaculture, was administrated by the Ministry 
of Fisheries.  
The IP-discourse was also present in the Lysø-commission. Conservative 
politicians and large-scale fish farmers supported it, using the “Industrial-Model” as a 
frame of reference (described in chapter 4).  
Although, the NFF wanted economically feasible farms, the majority did not 
want an industrial structure. A registrations system with requirements regarding 
disease, pollution and locality would secure this. Regulations would hinder farms in 
taking advantage of their growing experience to improve efficiency and competition. 
The NFF worked for their members – the existing fish farmers. As a result, they 
worked to maximize the benefits of the member; thus, entry into the aquaculture 
industry had to be limited. With a limited entry, the individual production would be 
maximized; as a result, volume restrictions on farms were not desired.  
The RP-discourse was hegemonic throughout the 1970s and most of the1980s. 
Central actors such as the Ministry of Fisheries, the Directorate of Fisheries and the 
Labour Party - which had governmental power throughout most of the period - 
participated to maintain the dominance of the RP-discourse.  
 
A Shift in Discursive Practices 
The IP-discourse took increasingly root in the public debate from 1981. By 
1985, Listau (Minister of Fisheries from Conservative Party) proposed to deregulate 
the license regime. Conservative politicians, large-scale fish farmers and the NFF 
supported this policy.  
In the hearings in 1982, the NFF wanted production regulations related to 
infrastructure – it was just as important as marked demand. They also proposed a limit 
of 8 000 m3 - as technology was not yet mastered, and to give priority to existing 
farmers. They also supported the liberalization of ownership. Similarly, in 1985, the 
NFF wanted a total evaluation of the market - including infrastructure. However, this 
time, they were critical to liberalizing ownership, as it would undermine the regional 
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nature of the industry. Thus, NFF had changed their frame of reference from an IP-
discourse argument to an increasing use of RP-discourse arguments.  
The Directorate of Fisheries, still a significant actor, was in 1985 critical to 
deregulation of the act. Moreover, this directorate formulated and applied the 
regulations that accompanied the act; thus the practice of the legislation was in 
regional-policy friendly hands.  Hence, the process leading to the Aquaculture Act in 
1985 was initiated by the IP-discourse, but became dominated by the RP-discourse. 
 
New Discourses Emerge 
As the maximum allowable size and the fish density in farms increased, the 
late 1980s experienced environmental and health problems. Thus, environmental and 
health issues appeared in the public debate.  
LENKA and temporary safety zones introduced issues of pollution and 
limitation of space. The Ministry of Fisheries, with the support of the Ministry of 
Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture, implemented the temporary safety 
zones in 1989, thus institutionalizing the EP-discourse. 
Guidelines for allocation of licenses for the regional veterinaries were 
produced in 1989. These guidelines regulated the minimum distance between farms 
and were supported by the veterinaries and environmental interests. The industry had 
an increasing acceptance of veterinary regulations; veterinary regulations prevented 
disease and economic losses. The HP-discourse was institutionalized through these 
guidelines. Thus, two “new” discourses entered the scene from the late 1980s, 
immediately became very influential.  
 
Liberalization and Restrictions 
Ownership regulations were deregulated in 1991, with the Conservative Party 
as the designer and advocate and the Labour Government as a presenter. Other pro-
liberalization actors, previously not apparent in the aquaculture debate, became 
influential, such as: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry, the labour 
unions and the private banks. The Directorate of Fisheries still opposed liberalization, 
but the RP-discourse was losing ground to the IP-discourse – due to politics of 
liberalization and powerful actors.  
The EP-discourse further penetrated the public debate, as amendments to the 
Aquaculture Act included the term “sustainable development” in 1991. The inclusion 
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of the term was not contested; thus politicians and administrations were accepting the 
EP-discourse as a term of reference. 
 Two years later another guide to the regional veterinaries was produced. To 
combat diseases, the guidelines introduced generation separation and periodic 
abandonment of localities. Thus, the HP-discourse was re-represented and has become 
the regime that influences the use of space in aquaculture the most.  
The work towards the suggested National Salmon Watercourse and Fjords was 
initiated in 1997, based on environmental terms of references, such as point-pollution 
and protection of wild salmon stocks. Environmental interests, salmon interests and 
fishing interests supported the project.  However, the industry, the regional 
veterinaries and parts of the management questioned the actual effects of the project.  
Although the IP-discourse gained ground in 1991, so did the EP- and the HP-
discourses.  
 
Spatial Outcomes of the Different Discourses 
The RP-discourse was institutionalized through legislation, as the rhetoric was 
transformed into practice. Thus, the RP-discourse caused small and medium sized 
farms to be allocated along the entire Norwegian coast and fulfilled the objective of 
regional development.  
Although first presented in the Lysø-commission in 1973, the IP-discourse 
slowly penetrated the public debate to dominate in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As 
this discourse deregulated ownership, it caused an increase in domination of large 
companies and a reduction in local ownership, as well as increased size. 
The EP-discourse produced temporary safety zones in 1989 and was revived 
in 1997 and 2003, due to the suggested National Salmon Watercourses and Fjords. 
These projects excluded fish farming from areas that otherwise would be suitable for 
aquaculture; thus, increasing the pressure upon the remaining area and raising the 
potential for conflicts. The influence of the EP-discourse has increased since the end 
of the 1980s, due to a focus on environmental issues. 
 Finally, the HP-discourse was conceived in the wake of diseases and 
materialized through the guidelines in 1989 and 1993. Veterinary regulations have 
become the most important agent influencing the use of space in the coastal zone. 
With the exception of the IP-discourse, all of the discourses have, in general, resulted 
in an increased spatial use in Norwegian aquaculture. 
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Discursive Struggles among Powerful Actors 
There has been a struggle between discourses since 1973 and the powers of 
the discourses seem to fluctuate. In the beginning there was primarily a struggle 
between the RP- and the IP-discourse. The leading discourse of the two has changed 
throughout the period, but regional policy arguments have dominated the debate until 
the late 1980s. Although IP arguments were gaining support, the institutionalization 
of the RP-discourse, through legislation and practice, made the shift to an IP-
discourse difficult. Moreover, when institutions like the Directorate of Fisheries was 
producing as well as implementing the regulations, the transformation into a new 
frame of reference was not easy. The IP-discourse was institutionalized through 
policies in the early 1990s, but has struggled with the EP- and the HP-discourse ever 
since.  
The RP-discourse continued to be the dominant discourse throughout the 
1980s due to the powerful actors projecting and maintaining its terms of reference in 
the public debate. The IP-discourse increased its institutionalization and an increasing 
number of actors entered the IP framework. As a result, the influence of the discourse 
grew, but it was never to completely replace the RP-discourse. 
The reason for the limited dominance by the IP-discourse could be that it 
never was able to get a good footing within the public debate. EP- and HP-discourses 
were gaining ground at the expense of the IP-discourse. Attempts to promote IP 
arguments, such as increased scale of production, were “killed” by environmental and 
veterinary arguments. Over time the HP-discourse has grown to become the 
dominating discourse. Problems of animal and human health threatened profits; thus, 
both management and industry were willing to accept the veterinary regulations. As a 
result, the discourse was institutionalized.  The EP- and HP-discourses will continue 
to be terms of reference as long as these factors influence production.  
An interesting point is that two important actors changed discourses 
throughout the period. The NFF went from primarily using the IP framework, to a 
framework increasingly influenced by the RP-discourse. For instance, in the early 
1973, they promoted a registration system, rather than a license regime. By the early 
1990s, however, the same organization wanted to limit entrance into the industry. The 
NFF has an objective to protect its member - the existing farmers. Thus, a shift into a 
more protective framework (RP-discourse) should not be surprising.  
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Another important actor that shifted discursive framework was the Labour 
Party. In the 1980s the Labour Party was in support of a regional development policy 
using the RP-discourse. By 1991, when they proposed amendments to the 
Aquaculture Act, they had adopted the pro-liberalization arguments of the 

































Figure 13: Graphical illustration of the Influence of the Different Discourses upon Space 
 
A New Discourse: The Coastal Zone Management Discourse (CZM) 
The Plan and Building Act (PBL) of 1985 gave the municipalities the planning 
authority in the costal zone and it was extended to the base line in 1989 (Sandbæk, 
2003:90). A municipality produces a legally binding plan for the coastal zone 
according to the PBL, hence a coastal zone plan.  
Because aquaculture’s spatial use has increased tremendously in the recent 
past and because aquaculture is an activity that excludes other uses, it will cause 
conflicts. Thus, there is a need for ICZM.  
The CZM-discourse tells narratives of a dynamic management in a 
multidisciplinary and iterative process, in order to promote sustainable management 
in the coastal zone. CZM uses informed participation and cooperation of all 
stakeholders to assess societal goals in the coastal zone. In the long term, CZM try to 
balance environmental, economic, social, cultural and recreational objectives, within 
limits set by nature. It also integrates all relevant policy areas, sectors and levels of 
administrations, in time and space (EEA, 9th May 2003). 
 81
Those in favour of a coastal zone management system argue that it is a 
holistic, participatory and bottom-up approach; as well as an integrated and flexible 
system that addresses problems of managing conflicts among different users. The act 
co-ordinates and facilitates decentralized planning and includes plans for nature 
conservation and pollution abatement.  
Actors usually in favour of an ICZM system are municipalities believing that 
it will lead to increased freedom of action, and bureaucrats and planner believing 
CZM to solve problems of space as a scarce resource.  
However, there are actors involved that do not support the implementation of a 
CZM system and see such a system as a municipal “colonizing” of the coastal zone – 
that used to be a public commons. Thus, some municipalities view the CZM plans as 
obstacles reducing political freedom and increasing the bureaucracy. Moreover, the 
actors of the industry experience the plans as rigid and limiting. Some even claim 
coastal zone plans may create problems that otherwise would not be there, as every 
actor tries to secure their share. In addition, in small coastal communities, coastal 
zone planning is what they always have done, though often through more informal 
adjustment. Thus, CZM could be experienced as artificial and limiting.  
Still, there is an increased interest for ICZM. An increasing number of coastal 
municipalities are producing coastal zone plans, especially those with an aquaculture 
industry. The Norwegian Research Council is funding research on costal zone 
management and the Norwegian College of Fishery Science is starting a master 
program in coastal zone management.  
  
Conclusion 
The main aim of this paper has been to show how physical use of space has 
changed in Norwegian aquaculture since the early 1970s and what factors have led to 
this change. In general, we can say that pressure upon available space has increased 
and it has become more difficult to establish aquaculture farms in Norway. What 
factors have influenced space to become scarcer? First of all, veterinary requirements 
and conservation of area has led to an increase in area used by each individual fish 
farm, but also to a decline in available area.  
Secondly, the changes in spatial use may also be traced back to social 
discourses related to the development of the aquaculture industry. Use of space in 
aquaculture depends upon the discursive framework and arguments being used. As, 
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mentioned in the introduction, there are “optimists” and “pessimists”. Thus, one can 
say, the optimist does not see space as a limited input factor (e.g. Heen et al., 1993), 
whereas the pessimist see space as increasingly becoming a scarce resource (e.g. 
Vassdal, 2002).  
The Regional-Policy (RP) discourse, which dominated in the 1970s and the 
1980s, influenced spatial use by ensuring regional development through small-scale 
farms dispersed along the entire coast. In physical terms, this implied that each farm 
occupied a small area. However, the socially constructed discourse was the main 
driving force behind the size of farms. Thus, the small-scale and regional 
characteristics of the industry in the 1970s and 1980s can be traced back to the 
hegemonic discourse at the time – the RP discourse. 
Similarly, the outcome of the Industrial-Policy (IP) discourse was influenced 
by the physical requirements in aquaculture, as well as the socially constructed 
discourses. The discourse promoted an increase in maximum allowable volume, thus, 
an increased physical influence by each farm increased. This spatial outcome was a 
result of a socially constructed discourse, where the narratives were of economies-of-
scale and deregulation of ownership to secure the financial basis and competence in 
the industry.  As a result, not only did the volume increase, but the spatial distribution 
of farms also changed, as local ownership declined. Thus, we can say that the physical 
outcomes of both the RP- and the IP-discourse were in essence based upon socially 
constructed discourses. These discourses materialized through physical demands and 
were institutionalized through laws, regulations and practices. The RP-discourse, due 
to its institutionalization and dominance, was difficult to change, especially because 
governmental agencies (e.g. the Directorate of Fisheries) were carriers of an RP-
discourse long after the political landscape had moved toward an IP-discourse.  The 
influential actors in these discourses were mainly government agencies, the industry 
and politicians. The carriers of the RP-discourse in the 1970s and the 1980s were 
government agencies and politicians (e.g. Directorate of Fisheries, Ministry of 
Fisheries, The Labour Party). The carriers of the IP-discourse were the NFF, the 
Conservative Party and over time various ministries such as the Ministry of Finance. 
It is interesting, however, that both the Labour Party and the NFF changed their 
discursive frame over time – in opposite directions. The Labour Party adopted an IP-
discourse, whereas the NFF adopted the more protective RP-discourse.  
 83
Although the IP-discourse had its most influential period (so far) in the 1990s, 
it was never to become as hegemonic as the RP-discourse. This was because 
environmental and health problems in the aquaculture industry introduced another two 
discourses: the Environmental-Policy (EP) discourse and the Health-Policy (HP) 
discourse. Environmental interests constructed the EP-discourse, based on arguments 
of genetic pollution and protection of the wild stocks. The HP-discourse was based on 
arguments of animal and human health, socially produced by actors, such as the 
veterinarians. The physical outcomes of these discourses have been a reduction in 
available space and an increased use of space in Norwegian aquaculture industry. 
Both of these discourses have become institutionalized through laws, regulations and 
practices. The EP-discourses was institutionalized, first through the temporary safety 
zones and now through the plans for National Salmon Watercourses and Fjord. The 
influential actors in this discourse has been environmental interests, county governors, 
the Ministry of Environment, as well as a number of NGOs, e.g. recreational 
fishermen. The HP-discourse has been re-represented through the continued presence 
of disease and was institutionalized through the guidelines produced by the 
Norwegian Animal Health Authorities. Thus, the veterinary authorities have, by far, 
been the most influential actor in the implementation of health regulations.  
Due to the rapid growth in aquaculture and the resulting increase in conflicts 
of sea space in the coastal zone, we are now moving toward a Costal Zone 
Management (CZM) discourse. This discourse capture a number of other discourses, 





Figure 14: Contents of the CZM-discourse 
 
The CZM-discourse was institutionalized through the Plan and Building Act (PBL) of 
1985, which addressed participation of stakeholder. Thus, there are a large number of 
actors in a CZM-discourse. The central actors, though not necessarily the most 
influential, are the municipalities. Agencies administering sectoral laws, such as the 
Salt Water Fishing Act and the Aquaculture Act, also have large influences in the 
CZM. In addition, the aquaculture industry is influential, however, more in the north 
 
RP + IP + EP + HP < CZM 
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than the south, and may be the actor that gains them most from a proper coastal zone 
planning.  
Thus CZM may harmonize various competing interests and discourses, as it 
calls for participation of all stakeholders. However, it may also result in artificial 
conflicts between actors. The costal zone will continue to be an arena for struggling 
discourses, where the aim is to have a discourse’s idea of reality established as the 
only legitimate one.  
The question whether there is scarcity of space or not in Norwegian 
aquaculture depends upon a number of elements. First of all, the limitations of space 
will clearly depend upon the future development of technology. More advanced 
technology, such as rougher and submergible cages, will move aquaculture out of 
areas with limited space and high levels of conflict. Secondly, the use of space in 
aquaculture will also depend upon the number of fish farmers, as well as the size of 
each fish farm. However, given today’s technology, there is a limited supply of 
aquaculture localities available. Thirdly, the development of veterinary regulations 
will greatly affect the spatial use in aquaculture. There could be a possibility for 
increased production on each locality and localities situated closer; however, this will 
depend upon the characteristics and development of diseases and vaccines in the 
future. Fourthly, environmental interests, promoting conservation of sea area, will 
reduce available space for aquaculture. Finally, scarcity of space will to a great extent 
depend upon how different interests are successful in influencing the shaping of 
regulations and practices. Thus, the question of spatial scarcity will therefore be a 
question about what discourses dominate and what requirements are promoted 
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1973 8000 1172 
1975 5000 2517 
1977 5000 91 3932 
1981 3000 50 13042 
1983 5000 100 22703 
1985 8000 150 34615 
1988 12000 30 89874 
2002 12000 40 528000 
2003 12000 50? ?? 



















Appendix 2: Calculations of Area Used by a Fish Farm 
 









Area  =  ?  * r2  
Area = 3.14*5002 
Area = 785 000 m2 
Area = 0.785 km2 
 
5 000 m between farms 
Area  =  ?  * r2  
Area = 3.14* 2 5002 
Area = 19 625 000m2 
Area = 19.63 km2 
 
If we have 90 000 km2 then we have 4 600 localities (using 5 km minimum 
requirement). Today we use about 3 000 localities, of which 1 700 are salmon. This 
means that we have room for about     1 500 to 2 300 licenses.  
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